Indo China issues fourth installment of the article

In my message dated October 17. I had coverd the THIRD INSTALMENT ( pages 323 through 402) OF PROF. MOHAN MALIK’S MAGNUM OPUS ON "CHINA AND INDIA". While introducing the FIRST INSTALMENT, I had said: QUOTE: It was Francis Bacon, the 16th century English philosopher, who is quoted as saying that: "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.". Professor Mohan Malik’s 468 page book published this year, "CHINA AND INDIA: GREAT POWER RIVALS" -- definitely belongs to the third category. It is a closely argued work that calls for careful reading, line by line, paragraph by paragraph and page by page. Andrew Scobell of the RAND Corporation, rightly describes it as a "A tour-de-force study of China and India as rising powers." The publishers characterize the book thus: "Despite burgeoning trade and cultural links, China and India remain fierce competitors in a world of global economic rebalancing, power shifts , resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and other transnational security threats. Mohan Malik explores this increasingly important and complex relationship, grounding his analysis in the history of the two countries.....Malik describes a geopolitical rivalry, underpinned by contrasting systems, values and visions. His comparative analysis covers the broad spectrum of challenges that China and India face. Drawing on his extensive research and on-the-ground experience, he concludes with a discussion of alternative strategic futures for Sino-India relations." In my view, it is perhaps the best, most incisive and authoritative work on the state of bilateral relations between China and India published till date. **CHINA AND INDIA : GREAT POWER RIVALS ** by Mohan Malik, Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (468 pages), A FirstForumPress Book, 2011. If there is one book which foreign policy and military experts both within and outside the Governments of India and the United States (and perhaps also Japan and Southeast Asia) MUST read and digest, it is this, it is this, it is this!! UNQUOTE. The THIRD INSTALMENT had concluded as follows: QUOTE: Having discussed the various tilts, triangles, and permutations involving major powers in Asia, in the concluding section of his book, Professor Mohan Malik lays out five different scenarios of China-India relations to the year 2040: SCENARIO 1: Asian G 2 Partnership - "Lasting stability can be attained if China, India, the US, Japan and Russia join forces in an economic and security arrangement. India and China may be long-term, if not permanent, competitors, but their aspirations appear to be manageable..... The restoration of Tibet’s autonomy and a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute could be powerful mitigating factors in the China-India rivalry..... Despite no breakthrough yet on finding a solution to the thorny boundary issue, confidence-building measures on the disputed border has been put in place..... Hopefully, economic ties would provide the basis for an improved relationship that tides over political frictions..... Therefore, the long-term outcome could be a China-India condominium based on a need to focus on social and political stability, strong economic growth and a sense of security..... From India’s perspective, this would be the best case scenario." (P. 397-398). SCENARIO 2: Distant Neighbors: Competitors-cum-Partners - "Under this scenario..... even as a range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, old disputes and new frictions coupled with uncertainty over their future strategic alignments will keep them apart." (P. 398-399). SCENARIO 3: A Sino-Indian Cold War - "Noted China watcher Ross Terrill argues that China’s long-term strategy is driven by the twin goals of of establishing its hegemony in Asia and in regaining territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty..... These goals will invariably pit India against China..... Therefore, a new cold war could emerge ..... between India and China ..... New Delhi’s efforts to establish closer ties with Southeast and East Asian countries and to emerge as an independent power suggest future tension and friction between India and a China that aspires for regional and global preeminence..... A Chinese analyst, Dai Bing, admits, ’For the foreseeable future, therefore, while a cold war between the two countries is increasingly likely, a hot war is out of the question.’ At the same time, leaders in both countries will strive to ensure that tensions and frictions do not overwhelm the relationship as a whole." (P. 399-400). SCENARIO 4: A China-India War? - "The probability of another war between China and India, says sinologist John Garver, ’is not great. But it exists.’ Garver talks of three situations that might, singularly or in combination, lead to an armed conflict on the scale of 1962: ’Chinese intervention in an Indian-Pakistan war, a major uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, and the unresolved border dispute.’ ..... Though the probability is extremely low, should India come close to spoiling Bejing’s ’party of the century’ by outpacing China in economic growth, Beijing could lash out against India and others for its economic woes. More so, if acceleration in India’s economic growth coincides with a sharp deceleration in China’s economic growth rates." (P. 400-401). SCENARIO 5 will be covered in the fourth and final instalment of this series. UNQUOTE. Now for some depressing reading: excerpts from the FOURTH AND FINAL INSTALMENT of the book covering pages 402 through 409, which constitute the last part of the last Chapter titled, ’Triangles, Tilts and Strategic Futures’ and which focuses on Scenario 5. (Pages 410 through 468 are made up of bibliography, and index): "SCENARIO 5: India Capitulates to Big Brother China" (P. 402) "Under this scenario, the unequal strategic equation between China and India will eventually force India to capitulate and accept China as its big brother. Unlike China, India lacks the ability to think and plan strategically and mobilize the necessary resources and political will to achieve grand strategic goals. The major objective of Beijing’s south Asia policy is to undermine India’s will and sap its energy to compete with China by exploiting India’s internal contradictions and external vulnerabilities, preferably without striking a blow. This approach signals to Asia and the world that India falls short in being a ’balancing power’ so that no country looks toward India as a counterweight to China. A crucial means of ’victory without bloodshed’ (bing bu xue ren) in Chinese strategic tradition is to intimidate the hostile country into capitulation through provocation, brinkmanship, coercion, controlled escalation, and a shift in the balance of power. The aim is to convince the enemy, who is militarily weak and/or tied down with multiple security concerns, that the overall ’correlation of forces’ has shifted to his disadvantage and thus to force him to concede. From Beijing’s perspective, Indian capitulation would be the best outcome. As the power gap widens, the costs and risks of resisting or containing China will be too great for New Delhi to bear. The region will be overwhelmed by Chinese economic blandishments to support regimes politically hostile to India. One can conceive of situations that might produce, singularly or in combination, a scenario wherein India accommodates itself to an exponential growth in China’s power and accepts Chinese supremacy in the region: **If China can sustain near-double-digit economic growth, it would enable Beijing to attract most middle and small powers in support of its leadership role. **If the PLA succeeds in occupying the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh and giving India’s military a bloody nose, Indian leaders would then be much more deferential in dealing with China and Beijing need not worry about the ’India challenge’ any longer. **If a sequence of catastrophes weakened India severely: a nuclear conflagration, a two-front war with Pakistan and China...... **If the US economy goes into a free fall, culminating in the reduction or withdrawal of the US forward military presence, and if Japan slides into China’s orbit following the return of Taiwan to China’s fold. In that event New Delhi’s misplaced faith in the US-Japanese duo to enable India’s rise as an equal of China would undergo a quck burial. A weakened Russia may also fall short of great Indian expectations. Devoid of great power backing and left to fend for itself on multiple fronts, New Delhi will want to steer clear of any potential aggravation or competition with Beijing. **If an isolated India -- having fallen so far behind China in relative power terms -- chose to cope with the rise of China by bandwagoning with, rather than balancing against, the super power on its doorstep." (P. 402-403). "Contending that India is no match for China’s economic clout, strategic foresight and diplomatic influence, some observers have long maintained that the likelihood of India accepting China as the lord of Asia is far greater than China ever accepting South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. (J, W, Garver, The Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001, P. 387 ). Through a combination of trade, aid, resource extraction and infrastructure development, arms sale and bases, Beijing is seeking to extend its strategic perimeter in Asia and the Indian ocean region. Naturally, this makes it hard for China to accept any externally imposed barriers to its growth. Faced with continuing onslaught on its core interests, India may well conclude that the prudent course is to cut its losses and slide under the protective umbrella of Chinese hegemony. The sooner this realization dawns on New Delhi that it can do little to contain China’s phenomenal rise and global influence, the better India would be placed to benefit by partnering that growth and sliding into a supporting, junior partner’s role. This would require, of course, acquiescence to China’s leadership in Central and South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. India’s capitulation to Chinese power would, in turn, propitiate Beijing and prompt it to show magnanimity in settling the territorial dispute with its erstwhile rival turned partner." (P. 403-404). The above, clearly, is the worst case scenario. Professor Malik does not mention another possible scenario: The Chinese attack Arunachal Pradesh and India’s armed forces, well equipped with American weapons superior to anything that China may have, are able to stop them, and in the process give China’s armed forces a bloody nose (as the Vietnamese did in 1977). As for the Chinese being able to maintain their current lead in economic growth over India, not all agree. See, for example,’Shyam Saran: The myth of Chinese invincibility: The country’s economic policies are unsustainable even in the medium term,’ Business Standard, October 19, 2011, (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyam-saranmythchinese-invincibility/452967/). In his concluding remarks, Professor Malik says: "Strategic concerns will loom large as China’s growing military power and reach run up against the interests of other global and regional powers. The US-China-India triangle is very much in its infancy. Its future scope will depend on choices made in Washington, Beijing and New Delhi. There exists a vast power differential between the US and China and China and India. While the United States is omnipotent militarily, China is omnipresent economically. This power asymmetry deeply influences the strategic orientation of each toward the other and toward India. All three countries will use each other for their own reasons. The US does not wish to see Asia dominated by a single country..... For China, its economic relationship with the US is vitally important as a source of investment and technology and as its biggest export market that facilitates its rise as a global power. For India, its strategic ties with the US are essential to augmenting its position in Asia. In the triangular power balance game, Beijing fears India’s participation in the US containment of China. Conversely, India fears a Sino-US alignment that would allow Beijing to stunt the growth of Indian power or lead to US acknowledgement of the South Asian/Indian Ocean region as China’s sphere of influence." (Italics added). (P. 404). "Whether India enters into a soft or hard alignment with the US (or Japan and Russia, for that matter), will ultimately depend on China’s policy toward India. It will largely be determined by Beijing’s willingness or reluctance to accommodate India’s rise and aspirations. Strategic choices made by China and India will be, of course, critically shaped by the nature and degree of US engagement with both. Both Beijing and Washington recognize that a weak India would weaken the US position in Asia. Conversely, a strong India might prolong the US hegemony. Over the next 20 years, the US, China and India will try to manage peacefully a relationship that is fundamentally competitive..... both China and India will pro-actively court the US, each one seeking to move closer to Washington against the other. The future of the Asian security environment will depend a great deal on how and in what ways the US manages the rise of China and how and in what ways China, in turn, manages the rise of India and accommodates India’s interests. The past record of China’s India policy does not give much cause for optimism. Therefore, the decisive factor in this triangle witll be China’s behavior and policies. Moving away from its cold war posture of ’non-alignment,’ India is embarked upon a ’multi-alignment’ strategy to meet the China challenge as well as to facilitate its own rise as a great power. New Delhi is weaving a web of mutually inseparable relationships with an eye to opportunities and balance with great powers and trading partners, while trying to avoid overt alignment and confrontation. Though the US-India partnership represents the centerpiece of India’s strategy to balance China, India is looking beyond the US to safeguard its core interests. In a sense, India’s strategic ties with Russia, South Korea,Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia send a signal to China that India can become part of an anti-Chinese coalition should China take stances that threaten the security of its neighbors. In the meantime, a pro-US, pro-Japan tilt in India’s national security strategy -- a reaction to the power projection capabilities of neighboring China -- will be a defining characteristic of an increasingly globalized India." (P. 404-405). "Of all the scenarios considered in the last section, the one with the highest probability in the near future is that of a combination of geopolitical competition and selective partnership on transnational issues of mutual interest. The specter of a Sino-Indian Cold War is also looming large. The existence of two economically powerful nations would create new tensions, as they both strive to stamp their authority on the region. Over the long term, the possibility of confrontation cannot be completly ruled out either on their disputed borders post-Dalai Lama or due to Chinese intervention in an India-Pakistan war or because of aggressive patrolling in the Indian Ocean or a reversal in economic fortune. Barring a series of catastrophes that severely weakened or dismembered India, it is inconceivable that India would accept Chinese leadership of the Asian continent without first balancing it by alignment with like-minded ’China-wary’ countries. Divergent interests between China and India and the US and China preclude the possibility of a concert of powers emerging in the region. Conversely, Sino-Indian relations could also move in the direction of long-term cooperation." (405-406). The last part of the book reads: "Improvement in China-India relations over the long-term will depend upon Beijing’s assessment of India’s evolving political cohesion, economic growth, and military potential. Self-interest, greater confidence and pragmatism might see China and India evolving into benevolent hegemons that deal mananimously with nations near and far. It is possible that economically prosperous and militarily confident China and India might come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing returns, and the two Asian giants will become the co-leaders of a post-American world order. However, this is unlikely to happen in the short and medium term (that is, before the 2040s). History shows that when benefits outweigh costs and common interests override divergent issues, old rivals and sworn enemies do cooperate and become friends." (P. 406). END OF THE BOOK. It’s clear that so far as India is concerned, it needs to do two things: try to raise and maintan its rate of growth at a steady 9-10 percent and simultaneously build its defense infrastructure in its border areas and train and equip its armed forces with weapons superior to what the Chinese possess. One hopes that the penetrating and savvy contents of this monumental book, with special reference to the last section, will be carefully read and discussed by practitioners, academics and think tanks both in India and the United States (as well as Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia and NATO) plus US congressmen and India’s political parties and parliamentarians and, of course, US and Indian governments. From out of their deliberations one hopes concrete suggestions will emerge for India to act effectively to preserve its independence and outwit China by following a superior strategy. One last point: a suggestion for Professor Malik: Please quickly bring out a paperback edition of the book so that thinking people who have an interest in international issues both in the US and India will be able to buy and read it. Cheers, Ram Narayanan US-India Friendship http://www.usindiafriendship.net/