In my message dated October 12. I had coverd the SECOND INSTALMENT (pages 165 through 322) OF PROF. MOHAN MALIK’S MAGNUM OPUS ON "CHINA AND INDIA".
While introducing the FIRST INSTALMENT, I had said:
QUOTE:
It was Francis Bacon, the 16th century English philosopher, who is quoted as saying that: "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.". Professor Mohan Malik’s 468 page book published this year, "CHINA AND INDIA: GREAT POWER RIVALS" -- definitely belongs to the third category. It is a closely argued work that calls for careful reading, line by line, paragraph by paragraph and page by page. Andrew Scobell of the RAND Corporation, rightly describes it as a "A tour-de-force study of China and India as rising powers."
The publishers characterize the book thus:
"Despite burgeoning trade and cultural links, China and India remain fierce competitors in a world of global economic rebalancing, power shifts , resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and other transnational security threats. Mohan Malik explores this increasingly important and complex relationship, grounding his analysis in the history of the two countries.....Malik describes a geopolitical rivalry, underpinned by contrasting systems, values and visions. His comparative analysis covers the broad spectrum of challenges that China and India face. Drawing on his extensive research and on-the-ground experience, he concludes with a discussion of alternative strategic futures for Sino-India relations.
In my view, it is perhaps the best, most incisive and authoritative work on the state of bilateral relations between China and India published till date.
**CHINA AND INDIA : GREAT POWER RIVALS ** by Mohan Malik, Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (468 pages), A FirstForumPress Book, 2011.
If there is one book which foreign policy and military experts both within and outside the Governments of India and the United States (and perhaps also Japan and Southeast Asia) MUST read and digest, it is this, it is this, it is this!!
UNQUOTE.
Now follow excerpts from the THIRD INSTALMENT of the book covering pages 323 through 402 which contain some brilliant insights, especially in the last Chapter which is titled, ’Triangles, Tilts and Strategic Futures’:
"Current geostrategic, economic energy, and demographic trends indicate that the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) could well emerge as the strategic center of the twenty-first century, much as the Atlantic and Pacific oceans played this role in the twentieth century." (P. 325).
"China is giving massive aid to Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts and security assistance agreements, and building ports and signal intelligence facilities along the strategic sea lanes. Washington and Tokyo seem to be tacitly backing India’s role as a counterweight to China, thereby fuelling a maritime rivalry between Asia’s emerging giants." (P. 329).
"The IOR is the world’s main medium for the transportation of energy - primarily oil and gas from the resource periphery comprising the Middle East and parts of Africa to the ’demand heartland’ comprised mainly of India, China and Japan. More than 100,000 commercial vessels transit through the IOR each year, and crude oil is the biggest single cargo in terms of volume through these sea lanes of communication (SLOC), which are viewed by energy-dependent states as their very lifelines. At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is only 21 miles wide. The Strait of Malacca is only 1.6 miles wide in the Phillips Channel, creating a natural bottleneck, as well as potential for collisions, grounding or oil spills. The closing down of either strait will have disastrous consequences for the global economy." (P. 330).
"Nearly half of the world’s 20 failing states are in the IOR." (P. 332).
"The IOR accounts for around 70 percent of the world’s natural disasters." (P. 333).
"Many Indian strategists believe that China would use the Gwader port at the mouth of the Hormuz Strait to block or threaten Indian routes for shipping petroleum from the Persian Gulf in the event of a conflict " (P. 334).
"Based on current trends, the Chinese naval armada is likely to outnumber US ships within a decade or so while India is aiming for a 170-ship navy." (P. 338). "However, Chinese and Indian navies will continue to lag far behind in firpower, technological sophistication, and across-the-board capabilities" (Note - 363).
"China is reportedly trying to trump India’s military aid program for the Maldives by offering to build a naval base for the tiny island-nation." (Note -364).
"A major reason China’s state-owned oil companies have outfoxed their Indian counterparts in securing oil deals in a number of countries is that the former can draw on generous lines of credit from the Chinese government, which also offers diplomatic and military support to supplier states. India, in contrast, lacks China’s deep pockets ..., diplomatic clout (in the form of UN Security Council veto), and surplus armaments (both conventional and nuclear) which have proved crucial in swinging deals in Beijing’s favor. Further, Chinese oil companies are not averse to entering into uneconomic deals, driven as they are less by market and profit considerations and more by the Chinese government’s strategy to establish strategic footholds and lock up resources." (P. 349).
"In March 2009, Beijing was miffed over Jakarta spurning China’s offer for securing the Malacca Straits and instead inviting rival India to send ships for joint patrols apparently to ensure that ’all approaches to the strait would be safeguarded.’ Beijing’s desire to contain Indian power is no secret. Chinese strategic writings express angst over India’s growing military power, its ability to ’resist China’ and its assertion of influence in the IOR. Of particular concern are India’s evolving ties with the United States and Japan. Worried by the growing talk in Washington’s policy circles and New Delhi of India emerging as a counterweight to China on the one hand and the fragile, radical Islamic states on the other, Beijing views a potential US-Indian alignment and the India-Japan global partnership with horror." (Italics added) (P. 350).
"Indian and Chinese navies are showing the flag in the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. Their maritime rivalry is likely to spill into the open in about a couple of decades’ time, when an Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and a Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly to safeguard their respective sea lanes of communication. ..... China’s penetration of the Indian Ocean rimlands is now reportedly on the agenda of India’s bilateral security dialogues with Washington and Tokyo. The more India feels ’encircled’ by China, the more it will tilt toward the United States and Japan." (P. 357).
"The degree of cooperation and competition between China and India will determine the stability and security of the IOR, which lacks an overarching security system. It is possible China and India may come to terms with each other eventually in favor of cooperative burden-sharing as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing returns but this is unlikely to happen in the short to medium term. (P. 358)."
"Great powers have great egos, and they often clash. Therefore, the risk of conflict increases (a) if the United States fails to manage China’s rise; (b) if China is tempted to precipitate the US economic decline; and (c) if China blocks accommodation of rising India in the regional and international system." (P. 370).
"In the early twenty-first century, the key elements of China’s grand strategy can be identified as follows:
**Acquire ’comprehensive national power’ essential to realizing the status of a ’global great power that is second to none’ by 2049 (marking 100 years of the founding of the PRC);
**Gain Access to global natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China’s economic expansion. As an old Chinese proverb puts it, ’yang, wei zhong yong’: make foreign resources, goods and technology help China become strong and powerful;
**Pursue ’three Ms’: Military modernization (including naval presence along the vital maritime choke points), multilateralism, and multipolarity; and
**Build a worldwide network of China’s friends and allies through ’soft power’ diplomacy and economic dependencies via free trade agreements, investment, mutual security pacts, arms sales and bases." (Italics added) (P. 371).
"China’s pursuit of comprehensive power is aimed at ensuring that no other country in Asia has the wherewithal to undermine what Beijing claims to be its ’core national interests.’ This power maximization drive has already widened the gap between China and its neighbours, especially Russia, Japan, and India. On a normative level, China’s growing global influence will empower it to lay down new rules for the post-American international order." (371-372).
"A survey conducted in China revealed that many interviewees thought that ’a stronger China will try to restore its traditional vassal system.’ Historically there has never been a time when China has co-existed on equal terms with another power of similar or lesser stature. However, with the exception of a few, most Asian countries show little or no desire to live in a China-led or China-dominated Asia. Instead they seek to preserve existing security alliances and pursue sophisticated diplomatic and hedging strategies designed to give them more freedom of action while avoiding overt alignment with major powers.. Being a distant hegemon, the United States remains the balancer of choice for many countries on China’s periphery. Most Asian countries are strengthening their security ties with the United States as part of their hedging or balancing strategy even as they become increasingly dependent on the Chinese market for trade, prosperity and economic well-being. (Italics added) (P. 372)."
"Of all countries in China’s periphery, India is in a category of its own. Since India has never been part of the Sinic world order or tributary state system but a civilization-empire in itself, it remains genetically ill-disposed to sliding into China’s orbit without resistance." (P. 373).
"Notwithstanding customary denials in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi that ’India-US relations and China-India relations have their own compelling logic,’ or that India (or the United States) is not seeking to ’develop relations with any country to counterbalance another,’ practitioners and academics recognize the growing significance of the US-China-India triangular relationship that has now effectively replaced the US-Sino-Soviet triangle of the Cold War era..... the US military presence post-9/11 in South and Central Asia has made Washington not only the most important strategic factor in the Sino-Indian geopolitical equation but also given it the ability to promote or undermine the interests of China and India vis-a-vis one another." (P. 375).
"The state of the Sino-US relationship has always heavily influenced India’s foreign policy orientation. For instance, President Nixon’s courting of Mao’s China in 1971 pushed non-aligned India firmly into the Soviet embrace, leading to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Coperation in August 1971, and later influenced New Delhi’s decision to carry out a nuclear test in 1974 to prevent potential nuclear blackmail. Throughout the 1980s India’s close ties with the Soviet Union as well as China’s quasi alliance with the United States (forged after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) and military alliance with Pakistan hampered the development of Sino-Indian, Indian-American and Sino-Soviet ties. President Bill Clinton’s attempts to establish a US-China condominium (’China first’ policy, albeit short-lived) with Jiang Zemin’s China in 1997-98 encouraged India to openly advance its nuclear and ballistic capabilities in May 1998." (Italics added) (P. 375-376).
"On balance, China has played the triangular game (’the US card’) to advance its interests over the last three decades more effectively than India." [A table on page 377 illustrates this point.] (P. 376).
"However, the future of the US-China-India triangle is unlikely to resemble the past. The formal understanding that existed between Beijing and Washington since 1971 that ’the US would not do anything in South Asia without consulting China’ came to an end under the Bush administration (2001-08). Calculations aimed at influencing China’s behavior are now a part of the decisionmaking in both Washington and New Delhi. The United States conducts a regular dialogue with India over China and East Asia and holds a separate dialogus with China over India and South Asia. (Italics added)." (P. 376-77).
"In a complete reversal of roles, it is now Beijing’s turn to fear the worst: that India could play the same role in the US security calculus vis-a-vis China (should the Sino-US relationship deteriorate into a new Cold War) that China had played against the former Soviet Union from 1971 to 1989." (P. 378).
"A resolution of the Taiwan issue would lead to the deployment of half of the Chinese naval fleet in the Indian Ocean and increse the number of Chinese missiles and other assets deployed against Indian targets. Likewise a resolution of the Kashmir dispute would lead to the redeployment of India’s military assets on the India-China border." (P. 378).
"The ’India factor’ is increasingly entering the ongoing US policy debate over China. For India, just by being there as India -- democratic, secular, powerful, prosperous, and successful -- frustrates China’s attempt to establish a Sino-centric regional order." (P. 379).
"China views itself as the only rightful preeminent power in Asia and does not want to see India raising its power, profile, and stature." (P.393).
"The reality of the US-China-India triangular relationship....: Short of a major rupture in US-Chinese or Indian-Chinese relations, it is unlikely to crystallize into rigid alignments, China’s emergence as the engine of world economic growth means that an explicitly anti-Chinese alignment will be politically a hard sell. Besides, for India to be able to play a significant role in the eventual outcome of the US-China rivalry in Asia, there should be a significant decline in US military support for Pakistan and sustained growth in India’s economy." (P. 386)
"Beijing’s reluctance to adapt its policies to accommodate India’s rise and the fact that both China and India value their ties with the United States more than with each other provides Washington with enormous leverage vis-a-vis the two Asian giants. However, the United States would find itself in a disadvantageous position in the event of a China-India bonhomie (the Copenhagen Climate Change conference in 2009 was one good example)." (P. 387).
"India is the only large economy that is neither in debt to China nor dependent on the Chinese market for its own growth..... Strategically, close economic and technological links with the United States help realize India’s power potential. Still New Delhi would want to avoid any formal alignment with Washington partly because of concern that such an alignment will prompt the Chinese to tighten their embrace of India’s smaller neighbors, which, in turn, will exacerbate India’s security dilemma. An alignment with the US might so alienate and antagonize Beijing as to make it overtly hostile to Indian interests. And partly there remains a very strong undercurrent of suspicion and fear that Washington is a fickle and not-so-reliable partner and that US priorities and policies vis-a-vis China might change in the future to the detriment of India’s national interests." (P. 388).
"Washington’s silence on the Sino-Indian border dispute as Beijing ratcheted up tensions in 2009 coincided with the moves to abandon those aspects of military engagement with New Delhi that could rile China, including any joint army drill in Arunachal Pradesh and any further US-India naval maneuvres involving Japan or more parties like Australia and Singapore." (P. 389).
"Indians worry that the United States may not come to India’s rescue in times of crisis. Ashley Tellis sums up India’s triangular tribulations: ’India’s long-term concerns essentially pertain to the rise of China, and the thing New Delhi is most afraid of is that US weakness - or perceptions of current US weakness - might put Washington in a position where it ends up either colluding with the Chinese, or being excessively solicitous of Chinese preferences. Both these outcomes are very dangerous for India.’ " (P. 390).
"China and India are engaged in a battle of wits on a range of issues from territorial disputes to maritime expansion to nuclear issues to trade and currency to institutional shadow-boxing. Should New Delhi perceive the dragon running rampant in lands and seas around India, the possibility of a weak Indian tilt toward the United States turning into an alignment against China cannot be ruled out." (P. 391).
"It is not in China’s interest to pursue a hard-line approach that could backfire and drive India and its other Asian neighbors into stronger opposition to China and into deeper alignment with Tokyo and Washington, culminating in the emegence of of an Asian NATO, an outcome that the Chinese dread most." (P. 393).
Having discussed the various tilts, triangles, and permutations involving major powers in Asia, in the concluding section of his book, Professor Mohan Malik lays out five different scenarios of China-India relations to the year 2040:
SCENARIO 1: Asian G 2 Partnership - "Lasting stability can be attained if China, India, the US, Japan and Russia join forces in an economic and security arrangement. India and China may be long-term, if not permanent, competitors, but their aspirations appear to be manageable..... The restoration of Tibet’s autonomy and a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute could be powerful mitigating factors in the China-India rivalry..... Despite no breakthrough yet on finding a solution to the thorny boundary issue, confidence-building measures on the disputed border has been put in place..... Hopefully, economic ties would provide the basis for an improved relationship that tides over political frictions..... Therefore, the long-term outcome could be a China-India condominium based on a need to focus on social and political stability, strong economic growth and a sense of security..... From India’s perspective, this would be the best case scenario." (P. 397-398).
SCENARIO 2: Distant Neighbors: Competitors-cum-Partners - "Under this scenario..... even as a range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, old disputes and new frictions coupled with uncertainty over their future strategic alignments will keep them apart." (P. 398-399).
SCENARIO 3: A Sino-Indian Cold War - "Noted China watcher Ross Terrill argues that China’s long-term strategy is driven by the twin goals of of establishing its hegemony in Asia and in regaining territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty..... These goals will invariably pit India against China..... Therefore, a new cold war could emerge ..... between India and China ..... New Delhi’s efforts to establish closer ties with Southeast and East Asian countries and to emerge as an independent power suggest future tension and friction between India and a China that aspires for regional and global preeminence..... A Chinese analyst, Dai Bing, admits, ’For the foreseeable future, therefore, while a cold war between the two countries is increasingly likely, a hot war is out of the question.’ At the same time, leaders in both countries will strive to ensure that tensions and frictions do not overwhelm the relationship as a whole." (P. 399-400).
SCENARIO 4: A China-India War? - "The probability of another war between China and India, says sinologist John Garver, ’is not great. But it exists.’ Garver talks of three situations that might, singularly or in combination, lead to an armed conflict on the scale of 1962: ’Chinese intervention in an Indian-Pakistan war, a major uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, and the unresolved border dispute.’ ..... Though the probability is extremely low, should India come close to spoiling Bejing’s ’party of the century’ by outpacing China in economic growth, Beijing could lash out against India and others for its economic woes. More so, if acceleration in India’s economic growth coincides with a sharp deceleration in China’s economic growth rates." (P. 400-401).
SCENARIO 5 will be covered in the fourth and final instalment of this series.
One hopes that the penetrating and savvy contents of this monumental book will be carefully read by practitoners, academics and think tanks both in India and the United States.
Cheers,
Ram Narayanan
US-India Friendship
http://www.usindiafriendship.net/
No comments:
Post a Comment