India Rise puts China on Edge

December 10, 2011 India’s Rise Puts China on Edge By Greg Sheridan The birth of a superpower can be a strange and disturbing event to witness. There is a lot of screaming, a lot of pain, it’s inherently messy; but sometimes something beautiful will emerge. Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) in West Bengal was once, before World War II, governed by an Australian, Richard Casey. As a city, it offers in every aspect the harshest contrasts of Indian life. Near the airport, in the incongruously named Salt Lake district, sparkling new apartments and IT offices abound. And in the city centre, at the Oberoi Hotel, every sweet fragrance, every self-indulgent elegance of the British Raj is perfectly maintained. But Kolkata, for many decades under communist rule, has not boomed like other Indian cities. Just a few blocks from the Oberoi families live in makeshift tents on the footpath, mothers washing babies without a shred of privacy. Middle-aged men, homeless and hungry, sleep on the balustrades on the edge of a public park. And on Sunday, everywhere the eye can see, men and boys play cricket. But don’t be fooled by the surface chaos. The elephant is stirring. Even without further slashing economic reform, India’s economy will likely grow by 7 per cent or 8 per cent a year for the next two decades or more, becoming in time the world’s third largest economy. As Defence Minister Stephen Smith says, in the 21st century there will be three superpowers: the US, China and India. But don’t think this transition will be smooth. Casey’s successor in the Kolkata governor’s residence is a smooth former Indian civil servant, and before that policeman, M.K. Narayanan. He was once India’s national security adviser. This week he opened a conference on the Asian Century sponsored by the University of Melbourne’s Australia India Institute. He had two themes. One was that Australia had nothing to be concerned about from India’s rise. This struck me as true but a little bit of an odd thing to say. I can’t remember the last Australian who expressed any concern about India’s rise. The second notable theme was more blunt. China, he said, was a nation that did not observe international norms. This statement was neither controversial nor emotive. It was matter-of-fact. Everyone has a certain idea of the likely shape of strategic competition in the years to come. The established superpower will have difficulty accommodating the rise of a new one. Everyone thinks this means the US will have difficulty accommodating a rising China. But in terms of stress, aggravation and in the worst case the risk of conflict, this is likelier to come from China having difficulty accommodating a rising India. India’s attitude to China is many layered and exceptionally complex. But two features stand out. One is that India and China are doing a booming trade, worth more than $US60 billion ($585bn) last year. They each benefit from the other’s growth. Perhaps even more important is that no nation in Asia is more naturally, inevitably and unavoidably a strategic competitor with China than is India. A good deal of attention is given to their contradictory economic models, and equally to the fact India is a democracy and China an authoritarian, centrally governed communist dictatorship. Proponents of the Chinese model say the swiftness of government decision-making gives it an economic advantage. Proponents of the Indian model counter that while dictatorship looks stable, it is really brittle, and democracies are built to last. And India’s younger population structure means it is likely to be able to sustain high economic growth for much longer than China. But not enough attention is paid to the hard power and geo-strategic clash between the two rising Asian giants. From the Indian point of view, Beijing has already taken massive action over decades to try to keep India weak and vulnerable. At the Kolkata conference I interviewed one of the most influential figures in Indian strategic policy. Gopalaswamy Parthasarathy is a former Indian ambassador to Australia and to Pakistan. Partha, as he is universally known, is now a professor of strategic studies, but also a highly influential adviser to government on security matters. "China is today the greatest proliferator of nuclear weapons technology and missiles," he says. "It has over the last four decades supplied Pakistan with nuclear weapons designs and equipment for enriching uranium. In more recent years it has been supplying Pakistan with plutonium reactors and reprocessing plants to make plutonium warheads to fit on Chinese-designed missiles. These warheads can develop thermo-nuclear capability. "This Sino-Pakistan nuclear co-operation has enabled Pakistan to proliferate nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran." China’s actions, Partha says, are "obviously primarily directed at India. Pakistan is the instrument of Chinese containment of India." Not every Indian is as stark in their words on China as Partha. But the basic dynamic of Beijing proliferating nuclear technology to Pakistan in order to give India endless trouble on its western border is widely accepted. Most Indians believe Beijing has done a great deal to mess India up. A few days later, on the other side of India, I go to see Ajai Sahni, editor of the South Asian Intelligence Review and director of the Institute for Conflict Management. I ask him about India’s non-Islamist security challenges, particularly the Maoist insurgency active across some nine states in the northeastern belt of India. "There is no direct Chinese government involvement with the Maoists," Sahni says. "The Maoists reject the China of today as a revisionist state. They find inspiration in the China of Mao’s day." But the Chinese do provide support to some of the ethnic insurgencies that operate in northeast India, near India’s border with China and its border with Burma. "Some Chinese weapons do come to the Maoists from the ethnic insurgent groups which do have Chinese connections," Sahni says. "Some of these groups earlier had safe havens in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal. They have all closed down. The groups have been drawn to Myanmar (Burma) and there they can be presented in one easy group to the Chinese government." Praveen Swami, a renowned strategic analyst for the Hindu newspaper, tells me some Naga insurgents get weapons and support from China and have been passing this on to the Maoists in India. "So far it’s mainly been Kalashnikovs, improvised explosive device courses and training," Praveen says. "Whenever this is raised with the Chinese they say it’s black-market stuff, but some people say it’s carried out by people with high (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army connections." The strategic conflict between India and China is the subject of a fascinating new book, China and India, Great Power Rivals, by Mohan Malik, a scholar based at a Hawaii think tank. One of the best books on any foreign subject this year, its thesis is that China is trying to stymie India’s rise. Malik paints a devastating portrait of Chinese nuclear proliferation, primarily to Pakistan. But he makes a persuasive case that Pakistan’s subsequent proliferation to nations such as North Korea and Iran is carried out with Chinese consent and serves Chinese strategic interests. Malik also demonstrates how China has effectively encircled India with Chinese strategic assets. "All of India’s neighbours," Malik writes, "remained China’s top five largest arms buyers: Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Iran and Sri Lanka." Since 2006, Beijing has deliberately turned up the heat on a long dormant territorial dispute, claiming sovereignty over the Indian territory of Aranachal Pradesh, and other territory near Tibet. It also continues to occupy part of Kashmir, which it took control of in its brief war with India in 1962. Until 2006, international observers thought these disputes had effectively been settled, with both sides accepting the actual lines of control as long-term borders. But in recent years, according to Malik, Chinese patrols have been deliberately crossing into Indian territory. Indian strategic analysts believe the Chinese use such patrols to signal displeasure with Delhi. But this is a dangerous game. India has reinforced its borders with thousands more troops and stationed advanced Sukhoi fighters there. Malik writes that Beijing’s strategy towards India has three elements. The first is encirclement, with "strengthened Chinese strategic presence in Tibet, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma and in the Indian Ocean island states". The second element is envelopment, which is essentially integrating all of India’s neighbours into the Chinese economy. The third element is entanglement, which Malik describes as "exploiting India’s domestic contradictions and multiple security concerns". India is not passive in the face of all this. It is pursuing a close military relationship with the US. It has recently had its navy in the South China Sea. It is drawing close to China’s neighbours such as Vietnam. As India’s economy grows, so does its power and strategic options. When India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it nominated China as the nuclear threat it was most concerned about. What does all this mean for Australia? Canberra has absolutely no desire to get into the middle of any argument between New Delhi and Beijing. But Beijing looks askance at the growing strategic intimacy between Canberra and New Delhi. Beijing tried to stop the Nuclear Suppliers Group endorsing the India-US nuclear agreement and was unhappy about Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India. Beijing has a rooted objection to any "outside" powers getting involved in Asian security. But while Canberra certainly continues to pursue a constructive relationship with Beijing, it is unashamedly intensifying its relationship with the US. And it is also slowly and methodically building a strategic relationship with India. Defence Minister Stephen Smith has been in India this week, his fourth visit as a government minister. I caught up with him in Delhi, where he told me: "What we have agreed to is to substantially enhance our practical co-operation on the military front starting with maritime and naval co-operation, understanding that this is a step-by-step process." There is nothing inevitable about unpleasant strategic competition between China and India. But at the very least, it is an intense and central dynamic in the power politics of the 21st century. Greg Sheridan is the Foreign Editor of the Australian.

Indo China issues fourth installment of the article

In my message dated October 17. I had coverd the THIRD INSTALMENT ( pages 323 through 402) OF PROF. MOHAN MALIK’S MAGNUM OPUS ON "CHINA AND INDIA". While introducing the FIRST INSTALMENT, I had said: QUOTE: It was Francis Bacon, the 16th century English philosopher, who is quoted as saying that: "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.". Professor Mohan Malik’s 468 page book published this year, "CHINA AND INDIA: GREAT POWER RIVALS" -- definitely belongs to the third category. It is a closely argued work that calls for careful reading, line by line, paragraph by paragraph and page by page. Andrew Scobell of the RAND Corporation, rightly describes it as a "A tour-de-force study of China and India as rising powers." The publishers characterize the book thus: "Despite burgeoning trade and cultural links, China and India remain fierce competitors in a world of global economic rebalancing, power shifts , resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and other transnational security threats. Mohan Malik explores this increasingly important and complex relationship, grounding his analysis in the history of the two countries.....Malik describes a geopolitical rivalry, underpinned by contrasting systems, values and visions. His comparative analysis covers the broad spectrum of challenges that China and India face. Drawing on his extensive research and on-the-ground experience, he concludes with a discussion of alternative strategic futures for Sino-India relations." In my view, it is perhaps the best, most incisive and authoritative work on the state of bilateral relations between China and India published till date. **CHINA AND INDIA : GREAT POWER RIVALS ** by Mohan Malik, Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (468 pages), A FirstForumPress Book, 2011. If there is one book which foreign policy and military experts both within and outside the Governments of India and the United States (and perhaps also Japan and Southeast Asia) MUST read and digest, it is this, it is this, it is this!! UNQUOTE. The THIRD INSTALMENT had concluded as follows: QUOTE: Having discussed the various tilts, triangles, and permutations involving major powers in Asia, in the concluding section of his book, Professor Mohan Malik lays out five different scenarios of China-India relations to the year 2040: SCENARIO 1: Asian G 2 Partnership - "Lasting stability can be attained if China, India, the US, Japan and Russia join forces in an economic and security arrangement. India and China may be long-term, if not permanent, competitors, but their aspirations appear to be manageable..... The restoration of Tibet’s autonomy and a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute could be powerful mitigating factors in the China-India rivalry..... Despite no breakthrough yet on finding a solution to the thorny boundary issue, confidence-building measures on the disputed border has been put in place..... Hopefully, economic ties would provide the basis for an improved relationship that tides over political frictions..... Therefore, the long-term outcome could be a China-India condominium based on a need to focus on social and political stability, strong economic growth and a sense of security..... From India’s perspective, this would be the best case scenario." (P. 397-398). SCENARIO 2: Distant Neighbors: Competitors-cum-Partners - "Under this scenario..... even as a range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, old disputes and new frictions coupled with uncertainty over their future strategic alignments will keep them apart." (P. 398-399). SCENARIO 3: A Sino-Indian Cold War - "Noted China watcher Ross Terrill argues that China’s long-term strategy is driven by the twin goals of of establishing its hegemony in Asia and in regaining territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty..... These goals will invariably pit India against China..... Therefore, a new cold war could emerge ..... between India and China ..... New Delhi’s efforts to establish closer ties with Southeast and East Asian countries and to emerge as an independent power suggest future tension and friction between India and a China that aspires for regional and global preeminence..... A Chinese analyst, Dai Bing, admits, ’For the foreseeable future, therefore, while a cold war between the two countries is increasingly likely, a hot war is out of the question.’ At the same time, leaders in both countries will strive to ensure that tensions and frictions do not overwhelm the relationship as a whole." (P. 399-400). SCENARIO 4: A China-India War? - "The probability of another war between China and India, says sinologist John Garver, ’is not great. But it exists.’ Garver talks of three situations that might, singularly or in combination, lead to an armed conflict on the scale of 1962: ’Chinese intervention in an Indian-Pakistan war, a major uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, and the unresolved border dispute.’ ..... Though the probability is extremely low, should India come close to spoiling Bejing’s ’party of the century’ by outpacing China in economic growth, Beijing could lash out against India and others for its economic woes. More so, if acceleration in India’s economic growth coincides with a sharp deceleration in China’s economic growth rates." (P. 400-401). SCENARIO 5 will be covered in the fourth and final instalment of this series. UNQUOTE. Now for some depressing reading: excerpts from the FOURTH AND FINAL INSTALMENT of the book covering pages 402 through 409, which constitute the last part of the last Chapter titled, ’Triangles, Tilts and Strategic Futures’ and which focuses on Scenario 5. (Pages 410 through 468 are made up of bibliography, and index): "SCENARIO 5: India Capitulates to Big Brother China" (P. 402) "Under this scenario, the unequal strategic equation between China and India will eventually force India to capitulate and accept China as its big brother. Unlike China, India lacks the ability to think and plan strategically and mobilize the necessary resources and political will to achieve grand strategic goals. The major objective of Beijing’s south Asia policy is to undermine India’s will and sap its energy to compete with China by exploiting India’s internal contradictions and external vulnerabilities, preferably without striking a blow. This approach signals to Asia and the world that India falls short in being a ’balancing power’ so that no country looks toward India as a counterweight to China. A crucial means of ’victory without bloodshed’ (bing bu xue ren) in Chinese strategic tradition is to intimidate the hostile country into capitulation through provocation, brinkmanship, coercion, controlled escalation, and a shift in the balance of power. The aim is to convince the enemy, who is militarily weak and/or tied down with multiple security concerns, that the overall ’correlation of forces’ has shifted to his disadvantage and thus to force him to concede. From Beijing’s perspective, Indian capitulation would be the best outcome. As the power gap widens, the costs and risks of resisting or containing China will be too great for New Delhi to bear. The region will be overwhelmed by Chinese economic blandishments to support regimes politically hostile to India. One can conceive of situations that might produce, singularly or in combination, a scenario wherein India accommodates itself to an exponential growth in China’s power and accepts Chinese supremacy in the region: **If China can sustain near-double-digit economic growth, it would enable Beijing to attract most middle and small powers in support of its leadership role. **If the PLA succeeds in occupying the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh and giving India’s military a bloody nose, Indian leaders would then be much more deferential in dealing with China and Beijing need not worry about the ’India challenge’ any longer. **If a sequence of catastrophes weakened India severely: a nuclear conflagration, a two-front war with Pakistan and China...... **If the US economy goes into a free fall, culminating in the reduction or withdrawal of the US forward military presence, and if Japan slides into China’s orbit following the return of Taiwan to China’s fold. In that event New Delhi’s misplaced faith in the US-Japanese duo to enable India’s rise as an equal of China would undergo a quck burial. A weakened Russia may also fall short of great Indian expectations. Devoid of great power backing and left to fend for itself on multiple fronts, New Delhi will want to steer clear of any potential aggravation or competition with Beijing. **If an isolated India -- having fallen so far behind China in relative power terms -- chose to cope with the rise of China by bandwagoning with, rather than balancing against, the super power on its doorstep." (P. 402-403). "Contending that India is no match for China’s economic clout, strategic foresight and diplomatic influence, some observers have long maintained that the likelihood of India accepting China as the lord of Asia is far greater than China ever accepting South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. (J, W, Garver, The Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001, P. 387 ). Through a combination of trade, aid, resource extraction and infrastructure development, arms sale and bases, Beijing is seeking to extend its strategic perimeter in Asia and the Indian ocean region. Naturally, this makes it hard for China to accept any externally imposed barriers to its growth. Faced with continuing onslaught on its core interests, India may well conclude that the prudent course is to cut its losses and slide under the protective umbrella of Chinese hegemony. The sooner this realization dawns on New Delhi that it can do little to contain China’s phenomenal rise and global influence, the better India would be placed to benefit by partnering that growth and sliding into a supporting, junior partner’s role. This would require, of course, acquiescence to China’s leadership in Central and South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. India’s capitulation to Chinese power would, in turn, propitiate Beijing and prompt it to show magnanimity in settling the territorial dispute with its erstwhile rival turned partner." (P. 403-404). The above, clearly, is the worst case scenario. Professor Malik does not mention another possible scenario: The Chinese attack Arunachal Pradesh and India’s armed forces, well equipped with American weapons superior to anything that China may have, are able to stop them, and in the process give China’s armed forces a bloody nose (as the Vietnamese did in 1977). As for the Chinese being able to maintain their current lead in economic growth over India, not all agree. See, for example,’Shyam Saran: The myth of Chinese invincibility: The country’s economic policies are unsustainable even in the medium term,’ Business Standard, October 19, 2011, (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyam-saranmythchinese-invincibility/452967/). In his concluding remarks, Professor Malik says: "Strategic concerns will loom large as China’s growing military power and reach run up against the interests of other global and regional powers. The US-China-India triangle is very much in its infancy. Its future scope will depend on choices made in Washington, Beijing and New Delhi. There exists a vast power differential between the US and China and China and India. While the United States is omnipotent militarily, China is omnipresent economically. This power asymmetry deeply influences the strategic orientation of each toward the other and toward India. All three countries will use each other for their own reasons. The US does not wish to see Asia dominated by a single country..... For China, its economic relationship with the US is vitally important as a source of investment and technology and as its biggest export market that facilitates its rise as a global power. For India, its strategic ties with the US are essential to augmenting its position in Asia. In the triangular power balance game, Beijing fears India’s participation in the US containment of China. Conversely, India fears a Sino-US alignment that would allow Beijing to stunt the growth of Indian power or lead to US acknowledgement of the South Asian/Indian Ocean region as China’s sphere of influence." (Italics added). (P. 404). "Whether India enters into a soft or hard alignment with the US (or Japan and Russia, for that matter), will ultimately depend on China’s policy toward India. It will largely be determined by Beijing’s willingness or reluctance to accommodate India’s rise and aspirations. Strategic choices made by China and India will be, of course, critically shaped by the nature and degree of US engagement with both. Both Beijing and Washington recognize that a weak India would weaken the US position in Asia. Conversely, a strong India might prolong the US hegemony. Over the next 20 years, the US, China and India will try to manage peacefully a relationship that is fundamentally competitive..... both China and India will pro-actively court the US, each one seeking to move closer to Washington against the other. The future of the Asian security environment will depend a great deal on how and in what ways the US manages the rise of China and how and in what ways China, in turn, manages the rise of India and accommodates India’s interests. The past record of China’s India policy does not give much cause for optimism. Therefore, the decisive factor in this triangle witll be China’s behavior and policies. Moving away from its cold war posture of ’non-alignment,’ India is embarked upon a ’multi-alignment’ strategy to meet the China challenge as well as to facilitate its own rise as a great power. New Delhi is weaving a web of mutually inseparable relationships with an eye to opportunities and balance with great powers and trading partners, while trying to avoid overt alignment and confrontation. Though the US-India partnership represents the centerpiece of India’s strategy to balance China, India is looking beyond the US to safeguard its core interests. In a sense, India’s strategic ties with Russia, South Korea,Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia send a signal to China that India can become part of an anti-Chinese coalition should China take stances that threaten the security of its neighbors. In the meantime, a pro-US, pro-Japan tilt in India’s national security strategy -- a reaction to the power projection capabilities of neighboring China -- will be a defining characteristic of an increasingly globalized India." (P. 404-405). "Of all the scenarios considered in the last section, the one with the highest probability in the near future is that of a combination of geopolitical competition and selective partnership on transnational issues of mutual interest. The specter of a Sino-Indian Cold War is also looming large. The existence of two economically powerful nations would create new tensions, as they both strive to stamp their authority on the region. Over the long term, the possibility of confrontation cannot be completly ruled out either on their disputed borders post-Dalai Lama or due to Chinese intervention in an India-Pakistan war or because of aggressive patrolling in the Indian Ocean or a reversal in economic fortune. Barring a series of catastrophes that severely weakened or dismembered India, it is inconceivable that India would accept Chinese leadership of the Asian continent without first balancing it by alignment with like-minded ’China-wary’ countries. Divergent interests between China and India and the US and China preclude the possibility of a concert of powers emerging in the region. Conversely, Sino-Indian relations could also move in the direction of long-term cooperation." (405-406). The last part of the book reads: "Improvement in China-India relations over the long-term will depend upon Beijing’s assessment of India’s evolving political cohesion, economic growth, and military potential. Self-interest, greater confidence and pragmatism might see China and India evolving into benevolent hegemons that deal mananimously with nations near and far. It is possible that economically prosperous and militarily confident China and India might come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing returns, and the two Asian giants will become the co-leaders of a post-American world order. However, this is unlikely to happen in the short and medium term (that is, before the 2040s). History shows that when benefits outweigh costs and common interests override divergent issues, old rivals and sworn enemies do cooperate and become friends." (P. 406). END OF THE BOOK. It’s clear that so far as India is concerned, it needs to do two things: try to raise and maintan its rate of growth at a steady 9-10 percent and simultaneously build its defense infrastructure in its border areas and train and equip its armed forces with weapons superior to what the Chinese possess. One hopes that the penetrating and savvy contents of this monumental book, with special reference to the last section, will be carefully read and discussed by practitioners, academics and think tanks both in India and the United States (as well as Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia and NATO) plus US congressmen and India’s political parties and parliamentarians and, of course, US and Indian governments. From out of their deliberations one hopes concrete suggestions will emerge for India to act effectively to preserve its independence and outwit China by following a superior strategy. One last point: a suggestion for Professor Malik: Please quickly bring out a paperback edition of the book so that thinking people who have an interest in international issues both in the US and India will be able to buy and read it. Cheers, Ram Narayanan US-India Friendship http://www.usindiafriendship.net/

Indo China Relations economics is not all: Raji's Article

Friday, September 3, 2010 India-China Relations: Economics Is Not All Here's the link to an article of mine on India-China relations, arguing that economics is not all. Trade and commercial ties have a limited role in fostering ties; in fact, they are subordinate to and occur within the more important structure of inter-state relations. India and China have grown lot closer in the last few years compared to the previous decade. There has, however, been a simultaneous rise of mutual suspicions. While the economic interaction between the two sides may have reached great heights, this cannot eliminate the growing suspicion on the strategic front. An NBR study recently argued that “Economic interdependence is hardly a “silver bullet” guaranteed to pacify interstate conflicts. Though it may constrain conflict escalation processes, interdependence also generates serious economic frictions that can easily offset or overwhelm its conflict-suppressing effects.”1 Meanwhile, there have been several studies arguing that economic traction between the two sides have several positive spin-off effects on India-China relations.2 I would argue that commerce clearly has a limited role to play in a country’s strategic game plan. Trade and commerce do not alter the realities of the strategic front. India-China economic and trade ties have been growing in the last few years, from just US $ 1.99 bn in 1999 to nearly US $ 60 bn. in 2010. Despite the imbalance in the trade, trade is one area that has continued to flourish without major hurdles. Liberal theorists assume that improved trade relations will diminish the scope for international conflict. The theorists believe in the “trade brings peace” argument,3 which is opposite to what the Realists would argue. The Realists are of the view that “trade and investment flows as occurring within — and being subordinate to — the more significant and enduring structure of interstate relations. It is international peace that permits and enables trade, not the reverse.” Additionally, Realists argue that “rational and responsible national leaders never lose sight of the fundamentally anarchic nature of the global system,” and “consequently, where economic liberals stress mutual absolute gains from trade, realists are primed to notice relative gains in which one party, or one country, benefits more than the other.” 4 Realists essentially see international politics as a state of anarchy, with none able to enforce law. Even when states agree to certain international rules and regulations, it is up to the state to enforce such laws, depending whether those laws are favourable to the state or not; protect their interests/security or not. As Armijo explains, “In such a self-help system of mutual distrust, the only rational stance for a responsible national government, sadly but inevitably, leads to large defense expenditures, arms races, and the potential for instability and even war, as insecure states may be tempted to attack preemptively.” This clearly explains the emerging India-China dynamics. Is trade and economic well-being of the other in the mutual interest of India and China? While it may be the case, but this trade and well-being aspect need to be situated within the overall framework of inter-state relations between India and China. Under such a scenario, economic well-being of each other may not be the case. For instance, India trying to create its own markets in Asia will not seen favourably by China. Another liberal argument is that both India and China have collaborated at various international fora on issues like climate change and WTO issues and that these interactions have fostered closer partnership between New Delhi and Beijing.5 Have these interactions, however, penetrated deep enough to reduce the suspicion and tension that has characterised India-China relations in the last few years? The answer may be no. While the two countries have worked together on some of these issues, competition and rivalry between them has only risen in the past few years.6 China has been increasingly testing India’s dominance in its own backyard. Despite SAARC being India’s creation, Beijing is much more active today in the organisation than India is.7 Beijing’s presence in South Asian countries, solidified through increasing trade and investment measures, have reduced India to a big geographical entity with not much influence.8 China’s pro-active approach towards South Asia appears to be a result of its own deepening relationship with South Asian countries as well as fulfilling its objective to emerge as a kind of “guardian” to all the South Asian countries. Second, it seems as an after-effect of the US-China Joint Statement in November 2009 for the two countries to jointly manage South Asia. As India continues to re-define and modify its foreign and security policies, given its increasing stature in the international arena, there is bound to be competition for influence, resources and so on. For instance, China has been critical of India’s closer ties with the United States or other Asian powers that could be apparently detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role. Beijing has also been wary of India’s Look East policy, its strengthened relations with Japan, Vietnam and several other ASEAN countries. Beijing feels that India’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia could potentially hamper China-ASEAN ties as well as reduce Beijing’s manoeuvring space in Asia. China’s increasing foray into Indian Ocean region has been allegedly to secure its own energy supplies and ensuring energy security. China has been seeking to build alternate energy transport and trade routes, anticipating problems on the Malacca Strait sometime in the future. However, given the kind of China wariness that exists in New Delhi, China’s expanding influence and presence in India’s neighbourhood has clearly upped the ante within the establishment as well as outside. Chinese actions raise suspicions in Delhi mainly for two reasons. One, factors like history and unsettled boundary and territorial issues will continue to hinder any prospect of India and China forging closer meaningful ties in the foreseeable future. The baggage of history continues to be a strong factor in India-China ties. The history and unsettled boundary issues as well as their respective roles in the emerging Asian strategic framework have created severe constraints in working out a good partnership between India and China. The trust deficit between New Delhi and Beijing is not something that is going to change dramatically in the next few years. Border issue is a symptom of the larger problem that exists between India and China. It is India’s increasing role and influence which is the crux. Even while both India and China recognise their inevitable role in shaping the Asian security order, they do differ radically on the kind of Asian layout for the future.9 India has continued to work at an inclusive approach as opposed to the Chinese’ exclusivist approach which appears directed against India, US and Japan. Beijing has continued to believe that its peaceful rise and the emergence as a dominant power in Asia is only an assumption of its rightful place in the region and in fact a return to the old, but natural order for the region. India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by any one power. ________________________________________ 1 William R. Thompson and David P. Rapkin, “Will Economic Interdependence Encourage China’s and India’s Peaceful Ascent?,” in Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence and Security (National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington), available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/Preview/SA06/SA06_China_India_Rise_preview.pdf. 2 For example, Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf; 3 John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, 2003, pp. 371-93; Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf, cited in Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-a.pdf. 4 Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-a.pdf. 5 Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf. 6 The increasing number of intrusions /and transgression on the India-China border, even in the sectors that were otherwise peaceful; Chinese Ambassador in India stating that the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to China; China’s issuance of stapled visas to people from Jammu & Kashmir; denial of visa to Gen. BS Jaswal, Commander, Northern Command; China gaining de facto control of Gilgit-Baltistan region, are instances of China trying to test India on the politico-strategic front. 7 While one can say that India has been laid back and even apathetic to its own neighbours, China’s argument that it is simply engaged in practical diplomacy may be farfetched. 8 China is clearly taking important steps to solidify its relationship with SAARC as a whole, in addition to having excellent relations with each of the member countries. At the recently concluded SAARC Summit, Beijing proposed an assistance of $300,000 to the SAARC Development Fund. 9 Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka are cases in point. However, each of the relations that Beijing has cultivated in India’s neighbourhood has had its negative impact on India’s own bilateral ties. Posted by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan at 1:47:00 PM Labels: Arunachal Pradesh, Economics, India-China Relations, Jammu and Kashmir, Japan, Liberalists, Realists, SAARC, Stapled Visas, US

India, US to enhance collaboration in research, skill development: then why not China

India, US to enhance collaboration in research, skill development
October 18, 2011 — INDOLINK Consulting (es)
Source: The Economic Times, Oct 17, 2011

New Delhi: In a bid to strengthen and deepen its strategic partnership with the United States, India will set up a “higher education platform” to enhance collaboration in research, skill development and student and faculty exchange. The announcement came as the first ever India-US education summit wrapped up in Washington. Both countries stressed on the need to enhance the scope of collaboration and identify new ways to encourage linkages and exchange programmes.

In a joint statement on higher education cooperation US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and human resources development minister Kapil Sibal agreed to make the higher education dialogue an annual bilateral event to “map out strategies for partnership in the field of education” between the two countries.

The dialogue, which would be held alternately in the US and India, should “identify areas for mutually beneficial exchanges and provide a platform for intense and meaningful collaboration among academia, private sector and government on both sides,” the joint statement said. India announced its intention to set up an “India-US higher education platform as a means to pursue these goals,” with Sibal pointing out that the dialogue process has to be managed “effectively”.

Both Sibal and Clinton were satisfied with the progress achieved under the Obama-Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative, launched in 2009. Proposals under the initiative will reviewed by a joint working group for academic awards in support of university partnerships. As part of the partnership, their reiterated their commitment to the Fulbright-Nehru Program and its contribution to leadership development and scholarly achievement and to encouraging an array of collaborations between higher education communities, such as the Yale-India program, for academic leadership and faculty development.

The two sides agreed to work together to ensure a continued expanded US-India higher education dialogue with representatives from government, academia and business that would interact on a regular basis. “Sibal and Clinton reaffirmed the strategic partnership between India and the United States for meaningful dialogue, cooperation, and engagement in the field of higher education,” the statement added.

The countries will also join forces to promote strategic institutional partnerships for strengthening and expansion of collaboration in priority areas of higher education, including science and engineering, social sciences, humanities, as well as address societal challenges in areas such as cyber security, energy, environment, health and agriculture, the joint statement said.

Enhanced cooperation in the field of education between the two would also include expansion in research and development, fostering partnerships in vocational education and skills enhancement, exploration of models for ‘educational institutions for the 21st Century’ and strengthening programmes for student and faculty exchange.

Language Change and Value Orientations in Chinese Culture : A study worth for India too

Web source: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Language+change+and+value+orientations+in+Chinese+culture.-a0266750010


Language Change and Value Orientations in Chinese Culture

The study of culture and communication has been approached from diverse perspectives by anthropologists, linguists, and communication scholars. One of the shared notions of culture is that culture is dynamic and ever changing. As McDaniel, Samovar, and Porter (2006) indicate, "Despite its historical nature, culture is by no means static" (p. 11). According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), the basic change of a culture is often "the result of interplay of internal variations and external force" (p. 43). In their study of cultural change in China, Chu and Ju (1993) state that change is an inherent characteristic of any culture, "It [culture] must be adaptive to changes in the external environment and internal conditions. A culture that fails to adapt to these changes will run the risk of extinction" (p. 8). While the causes for culture change are often attributed to factors such as social, economic, technological transformation or ideological and political shifts taking place within a culture or influenced by other cultures, the obvious and dynamic interrelation-ship between language and culture as impulse for culture change has not been given a sufficient attention.

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Hoijer (1964) indicates that change in culture is faithfully reflected in language. It follows naturally that the study of linguistic changes will offer insights to our understanding and explication of culture change. Unfortunately, according to Hoijer (1964), "Such contributions have not been made, results in part from the linguist's extreme concentration on language along and his [her] neglect of the problem of determining the role of language in the total culture" (p. 457). Although intercultural communication scholars are very much aware of the inseparable relationship between language and culture, they tend to emphasize the pragmatic elements of language or the interpretation of symbolic meanings in different cultural contexts (e.g., Carbaugh, 1990; Ting-Toomey & Korzenny, 1993). Few studies have been devoted to how language change reflects, facilitates, and perpetuates culture change. We contend in this study that language communicates culture as well as creates culture. Linguistic change not only reflects culture change, but also is responsible for cultural change. More importantly, the change in language and culture renews and creates infinite discursive possibilities as well as multi-dimensional human experiences. We will substantiate our argument in this paper by examining Chinese cultural value change in relation to language change from traditional Chinese culture to contemporary Chinese culture. The analysis is divided into four parts: (1) a review of scholarship on the relationship between language and culture, (2) language and traditional Chinese values, (3) language change in contemporary China, and (4) conclusion and implications.

Relationship between Language and Culture

The relationship between language and culture is considered interrelated and overlapping (e.g., Bright 1976; Gao, 2005; Goodenough 1956; Hymes 1962; Hudson 1980). Culture is shaped and transmitted through language. Language at the same time reflects culture. The familiar "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" indicates that language is a guide to culture and social reality (Sapir 1931; Whorf 1959). Such connection can be exemplified through the correspondence between linguistic features and cultural orientations. By examining Navaho language, for example, Hoijer (1994) postulates that there is a close correspondence between the verb usage in Navaho language and Navaho religious practice and world view. Wierzbicka (1986) concludes in her study of Australian English that "linguistic phenomena such as expressive derivations, elocutionary devices, and speech act verbs are related to the literature on the Australian society, national character, history, and culture" (p. 349). Cultural attributions and value orientations of a particular cultural group can be described, recognized, and predicted through the use of language. Studies of this nature are both linguistically intriguing and culturally revealing.

Needless to say, language plays an important role in cultural expressions, yet, the function of language far exceeds the mere reflection of the culture. Language also plays a role of constructing culture and social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Chen & Starosta, 2005; Kress & Hodge, 1979). As Whorf (1952) states, "the linguistic system of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas" (p. 5). As language embodies one's ever changing experience of the phenomena of the world, the speaker of a language will constantly reshape his/her cognitive systems and worldview through new categories of a discourse.

Halliday (1978) further defines language as having an experiential or ideational function. In Halliday's opinion, "The speaker can see through and around the settings of his [her] semantic system; but [s]he is aware that, in doing so, [s]he is seeing reality in a new light, like Alice in looking-glass house" (p. 333). Language serves to establish the system of ideas, creates new categories, and crystallizes a new sense of social reality. As culture is dynamic and ever changing, language is the mirror that reflects the change. In fact, language does not only reflect change, but also facilitates and creates change. The change in language, as Whorf (1959) puts it, "can transform our appreciation of the Cosmos" (p. vii).

A language may change in sound, structure, and meaning. According to Pateman (1987), "The most obvious cases of purposive actions changing a language state are lexical innovations and their acceptance" (p. 31). Hudson (1980) has identified two kinds of lexical change in a language. One is "by introducing a new form to carry the desired meanings," and the other is by using "the existing resources of the language that can be used to 'unpack' the meaning to be expressed" (p. 85). By doing so, new sets of values and social reality are constructed. Once new values, perceptions, and ideas are fixed in language, language begins to play the role of facilitating the cultural change. Following the change in language and new meanings humans attached to it, what was previously considered tolerable may become intolerable and unacceptable. For example, the term xiaojie (Miss) was used in China's past to address young women with high social status. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), it means "the class enemy from the bourgeois class;" and in contemporary China, the term means "prostitute." In Fowler's (1986) words, "Language does not just provide words for already existing concepts; it crystallizes and stabilizes ideas" (p. 18). In this example the word xiaojie has crystallized its meaning in each time period of Chinese history, signaling the change of Chinese cultural value orientation from respect for hierarchy to belligerent human relationships, to openness to market economy.

Trudgill (1974) has identified three aspects of change in a culture that is reflected and facilitated by lexicon change in a language: (1) the physical environment, (2) the social environment, and (3) the values of a society. China has experienced a dramatic social transformation in all these aspects in the past centuries, moving from a feudalized society ruled by emperors to a Republic governed by the Nationalist Party, then to a communist state under the leadership of Mao Zedong in 1949. During the communist regime, China adopted Marxist-Maoist ideology in its first 30 years and then shifted to a market economy with its door open to the West. Western influence came to China and facilitated the culture change in China at the turn of the 20th century; it was condemned during Mao's era, but came back again after Mao's death with the launch of economic reform and open-door policy in the early 1980s. In this paper we focus on the change of value systems as reflected and facilitated by the change in vocabulary inventory from conveying traditional values to establishing contemporary ideas in the Chinese culture.

Language and Traditional Chinese Values

Values were defined as "what we hold important in life and include such qualities as morality, ethics, and aesthetics" (McDaniel, Samovor, & Porter, 2006 p. 12) and "patterned principles" (Kluckhohn & Strodbeck, 1961, p. 4). Cultural values are the implicit and explicit principles in guiding and controlling the behaviors of people in a particular culture. Cultural values are rooted in a culture's philosophical, religious, and ideological traditions and are called upon by the social need and context of a culture.

The Chinese traditional cultural values have been introduced and studied in great length (Bond, 1986; Chan, 1963; Chen, 1991, 2006, 2010; Cheng, 1978; Fung, 1952, He, Zhu, & Peng, 2002; Lin, 1939; Moore, 1967; Yum, 1988). Moore (1967), for example, has synthesized twenty-one Chinese cultural value orientations. Among them are ethical consciousness, spirituality, filial piety, harmony, tolerance, and great love for learning. These traditional values are rooted in Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The doctrines of Confucianism, in particular, have influenced Chinese thoughts and behaviors for over 2,000 years. Our first part of the analysis is focused on three aspects of traditional Chinese value orientations as reflected and shaped by the use of vocabulary, sayings, proverbs, and epigrams (aphorisms) derived from Chinese classics and antiquities: (1) ethical idealism, (2) hierarchy in family relationship, and (3) kinship system.

Ethical Idealism

A prominent traditional Chinese cultural value is ethical idealism which was summarized by "Five Principles" derived from Confucian doctrines: "ren" (benevolence), "yi" (righteousness), "li" (propriety), "zhi" (wisdom), and "xin" (trustworthiness). These terms prescribe the ethical standards and proper social behaviors for the Chinese. They were not only used in the Confucian books, but also frequently appear in Chinese official language and interpersonal discourse, and are further employed in arts and literature for over 2,000 years.

The "Five Principles" have a great impact on the Chinese mentality of ethical idealism and spiritual values. Spiritual values, according to Tang (1967), consists of moral and religious activities, artistic and intellectual activities, and social values. In particular, they involve activities such as moral teaching, rituals, folk music, and ancestor worship. In ancient China, Chinese people learn the Confucian sayings from an early age in schools and are being reinforced by their parents, teachers, and friends. In contrast to Greek philosophical writings in which language style is characterized by logic and abstraction such as Aristotle's works, language style in most writings of Chinese philosophy is value-laden and in the forms of proverbs, witty sayings, and metaphors which are easy to comprehend and remember.

While the "Five Principles" express enduring values and ethical ideals, the means to achieve them is "exercising the body and cultivating the mind" through behaving in the manner such as "moderation," "honesty", "thrifty," "reciprocity" and "self-content." One is supposed to live a spiritually fulfilled and morally uplifted life. It is the Confucian belief that money and profit will corrupt morality as he said "Gentleman values justice, a base person values money" (Confucius, 4:16). Thus, sayings like "Gentleman is content with poverty;" "Poverty brings carefree life;" "Wealth only brings worries;" "Gentleman does not talk about money" became accepted value orientation for the educated Chinese in relation to money. They are guided by the popular saying that a person should "look at money as trash, but benevolence and righteousness as gold." As a result, the traditional Chinese value orientations despise profits and materialism.

The emphasis on ethical idealism from the Confucian tradition continued in the form of ideological conversion in Mao's era (Chu, 1977). The Chinese mentality of ethical idealism and contempt for materialism were reinforced by Mao's dogmatic adherence to communist ideology. Slogans such as "We'd rather want socialist weed than capitalist grass," "Wealthy people were bourgeois, capitalist running dogs, and exploiting other people" perpetuated the traditional belief that poverty can bring out goodness in people while wealth can lead to evil thoughts and action. The material disadvantaged people, "proletarians," are the ruling class of the nation. Thus, one should be proud of being poor as long as one is politically correct or "red." Consequently, China in Mao's era had wearied itself out in the ideological battles and had fallen behind in economic construction. Although overseas Chinese are well known for their success in doing business, the mainland Chinese did not have much of the material desire and economic consciousness until early 1980s.

Hierarchy in Family Relationship

It is a shared belief that one of the Chinese cultural characteristics is hierarchical relationship (Chen & Chung, 1994, Cheng, 1987; Liu, 1987; Wen, 1989). This culture characteristic is supposed to be the means to maintain "harmony" which is the key cultural value for the smooth function of Chinese social and family systems (Huang, 2000). It is believed that "Harmony is the first virtue." Harmony of a family and society is maintained by the hierarchical relationship demonstrated in the "Three Cardinals," including "Wives follow the order of husbands," "Ministers follow the order of the king," and " Son follows the order of fathers." We will examine the linguistic expressions of the two levels of family relationship: husband and wife, and parents and children.

Husband and Wife. Sayings like "Follow the man you marry, be he a fool or a crook" and "The husband sings, the wife accompanies" show the typical relationship between a husband and wife in the traditional Chinese family. The wife's status is subordinate to her husband. Ideally, the most important duty for the wife is to bear children for the family in order to "extend the generations." In a marriage, for example, a man is described to "marry" a woman, but a woman is "being married to" a man. After marriage the husband names his wife the "inside person" and the wife names his husband the "outside man."

The female subordination further develops a set of linguistic expressions that devalue the status of women in the Chinese society, including, for example, "wicked" (jian), "slave" (nu), "ignorant" (wang), "prostitute" (ji), "jealousy" (du), "hinder" (fang), "adultery" (jian), "greedy" (lan), "flattering" (mei), "detesting" (xian), and "envious" (ji). These vocabularies, all structured by the word "nu" (women), portray and perpetuate the negative image of Chinese women.

Parents and Children. Within the collectivistic family system of China, one becomes a member of a family in which one must learn to restrain oneself and to subdue one's individuality in order to maintain the harmony in the family (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The Western concepts of "individualism" and "privacy" do not exist in the Chinese linguistic expression. Traditionally, Chinese parents had the freedom to decide their children's future. The communication between Chinese parents and children was one way--from parents to children. The children were said to "have ears but no mouth." An interruption in an adult's conversation usually brought upon the children a severe punishment. Children were expected to fulfill their "filial piety" which required an unconditional sacrifice to their parents in any situation. Therefore, "Filial piety is the chief of the hundred virtues " and "Parents are always right" reflect the absolute respect children had to pay to their parents. Showing no reverence for parents is a "rebel against sacred custom." Moreover, according to Hsieh (1967), "The substantiation of benevolence begins with service to one's parents" (p. 172). Some elements of the traditional Chinese culture still form the basic fabrics of the modern Chinese society. A study by the Chinese Cultural Connection (1987) demonstrates that the Chinese in Hong Kong rank filial piety at the top and wealth the last one out of forty value orientations.

Kinship System

The traditional Chinese culture was shaped and created mainly by its rich vocabularies in kinship system. A complete Chinese kinship system is comprised of four categories: "Ben-jia" (one's own family), "wai-xing" (relatives outside the household), "nei-xi" (wife's relatives), and "qin-xi" (relatives of different surnames).

The kinship structure shows a complex but orderly communication system in which a clear terminology is attached to each positional role, and each role is assigned to perform a set of appropriate behaviors. The age hierarchy, for example, is shown in the relationship among siblings. The Chinese language has different terms distinguishing between an "elder brother" and a "younger brother," an "elder sister" and a "younger sister." In addition, numbers are used to indicate the order of age that in turn distinguishes each person's obligation in the family system. The kinship system also functions as a network of support and bonding. The notion "Blood is thicker than water" is definitely implied in the kinship system epitomized in the saying "Blood-related brothers beat the tiger together; father and son fight together in a battle." These phrases are very much culture bound, and it is difficult to find equivalent concepts in other language systems. The examples discussed above indicate the close relationship between cultural value orientations and language in the traditional Chinese society.

Language Change in Contemporary China

The traditional Chinese culture started to show inevitable signs of erosion since the mid-19th century. The major culture change took place in mainland China after 1949 when the Communists came to power and adopted Marxist ideology. Another obvious value orientation shift took place since the economic reform in the 1980s. We will examine some examples of lexical change and its impact on the change of Chinese cultural value orientation. The examples being examined are the combination of official language imposed by the government and language invented by common people. Three categories of value orientation shift were examined: (1) from ethical idealism to materialism, (2) from hierarchy to equality in family relationship, and (3) from kinship to "guanxi" (social network).

From Ethical Idealism to Materialism

Since the economic reform in the 1980s, the traditional value of living a plain life with few material comforts has been challenged. Language attached with the traditional ethical idealism has lost its moral appeal and persuasive power. Since the early 1980s, the ethos of China are "make money and become rich," "reform and open the door (to the West)," "material civilization," "profit and efficiency;" "fair competition," and "material stimulation." These are official expressions employed by the government-controlled media as a new form of propaganda. The use of such language also indicates a shift in China's value orientation. Link (1992) points out that "The widespread use of official language, coupled with the continuing assumption that it ought to relate to a vital ideology even though it does not, raised important problems of Chinese 'identity'" (p. 177).

Indeed, when this type of official language first appeared, it caused uncertainty and dilemma among the Chinese. As Chu and Hsu (1979) have observed, "The Chinese, like any other people, have sought to fulfill their material needs. The pursuit of material gains as a primary if not ultimate goal of life, however, appears to have been alien to most Chinese under the Confucian influence" (p. 398). However, it did not take much time for the Chinese to adjust themselves to the new language and new cultural values as they are endorsed and promoted by the government. Moreover, a group of metaphors was created by common people to vividly describe and label the change. Words such as "da kuan" (big money carrier), "xia hai" (going to the sea), a term used to refer to changing once prestigious professions such as teachers to business men or business women, and "te huo" (very fire), referring to making big money. Greetings like "wishing you rich and wealth," "wishing your life filled with money" are common among people. While the government language defined the Chinese economic reform as "unique Chinese socialism," a popular ditty spread out by common people described the dilemma as "confusing socialism, bashful capitalism, and deep-rooted feudalism."

At any rate, the impact of language in reshaping and creating a new Chinese culture is obvious. A survey conducted by a Chinese social science committee showed that since the economic reform, Chinese cultural values have changed in ten aspects: (1) the concept of becoming rich has been widely accepted, (2) people are more psychologically prepared for the market economy, (3) competition is much valued, (4) private enterprisers enjoy a good reputation, (5) about 80% of college graduates choose to do business or work in business-related companies, (6) many party officials and intellectuals want to have a second job, (7) the ideological crisis is replaced by a frantic pursuit of materialism, (8) people begin to recognize the significance of resources, (9) people desire for change and begin to rationalize the process of economic reform, and (10) psychological pressure and survival consciousness have increased (Press Freedom Guardian, 1992).

The drive for commercialization and desire for a better material life in China now resembles the time period of the industrial revolution in Europe and the gold rush period in the United States. However, the Chinese version of "gold rush" is disguised by the slogan, expressed in Deng Xiaoping's coinage "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." Ironically, while Deng appears to adhere to Mao's ideology politically, the slogan itself suggests and calls for change from Mao's era to Deng's era (Lu & Simons, 2006).

From Hierarchy to Equality in Family Relationship

The traditional value of hierarchical family relationship has undergone a significant change in contemporary China. Although the relationship between husband and wife, parents and children may not resemble that in American families, it has definitely shifted from hierarchy to equality.

Husband and Wife. Since Mao Zedong's statement that "Women can hold half of the sky," Chinese women's status has made a dramatic turn in its history. "Men and women are equal," "Women's emancipation," "Women can do whatever men can do" are slogans coined and propagandized by the government in an effort to do away with traditional values that were discriminating against women. As a result, the wife is no longer treated as the inferior; her place is no longer only in the kitchen; her role is no longer just bearing children. Husband and wife are equal in the family and at work. Over the years, a large number of "female machos" or "strong woman" has emerged. According to the report by Press Freedom Guardian (1994), one-third of the private enterprises in the nation are owned by women. In the family, husbands become(s) "under the control of the wife" as the husband has to give his income to the wife who is in charge of the family finance. In fact, as Chinese sportswomen are more successful than sportsmen in international competitions, the popular saying today is "Yin (female) is booming while yang (male) is declining."

The old notion that divorce is shameful and a married woman should remain as a widow after her husband dies is regarded as old-fashioned now. "Divorcing husband" is not uncommon and a woman does not have to "marry a roast, follow the roast, marry a dog, follow the dog." Women are encouraged to "respect yourself, be independent, and be strong." The wife is not "an inside person" anymore. Chinese women today "appear frequently in public, decked in their colorful best, with fancy coiffures and scented cosmetics" (Chu & Hsu, 1979, p. 263). Married women are participative in all kinds of social activities and represented in all walks of life. More importantly, most of them receive strong support from their "model husbands," a popular phrase that was unheard of in the traditional Chinese value system.

Parents and Children. Chu and Ju's (1993) study shows that the traditional filial obedience of children to parents has been challenged. About 42.3% of the informants in the study indicated that the traditional value of "filial piety" should be discarded. During Mao's era, the relationship between parents and children was marked by "class." As Chu and Ju (1993) vividly describe, "The son had to draw a clear 'revolutionary demarcation line' between him and his class-enemy father in order not to be 'ideologically poisoned' by the father's 'counter-revolutionary' ideas. In such a case, the value of 'benevolent father and filial son' had to be put aside" (p.226). In the post-Mao era, the value of "filial piety" is challenged by the increasing sense of individualism and independence of the Chinese young people. "Deciding my own marriage" has been a well accepted slogan by young people. Although parents still have their say in spouse selection and occupation decisions, their role is more like a consultant than commander. The current picture is that parents no longer dominate and control the lives of their children. Dong's study (2002) has shown that many Chinese parents have taken a democratic approach in parenting by encouraging their children to openly express themselves and participate in family decisions.

The government policy and slogan of "one couple, one child" has also affected the relationship between parents and child (Zhong, 2002). The only child in the family is called "little emperor." The value of the "filial piety" has made a dramatic semantic and functional shift as the result. In Chinese expression "xiao zi" (filial son), used to describe the obedience of the son to the father, is ironically used now to describe the obedience of the father to the son. "Xiao", an adjective originally means "filial piety" is now used as a verb in the shift. The doer of the filial son has become the recipient of obedience and service performed by the father. In general, the traditional value of hierarchy in age, sex, and generation is being gradually melted away (Lull & Sun, 1988). The value of equality has, to a large degree, replaced the value of hierarchy in family relationships.

From Kinship to "Guanxi"

The traditional system of kinship is still evident in Chinese culture. The terms used to describe the kinship relations are still applicable. However, while kinship is used to describe genetic or family connection, the notion of "guanxi" has been created to describe and reveal social connection and social relationship. In the kinship system, people call each other by their position roles in the family, and the purpose of addressing each other properly is to maintain hierarchy and harmony within the family. With the one child policy in China, such kinship system is being threatened. Some of the specific addresses for family members may cease to exist, such as "jiujui" (uncles from mother's side of the family) and "gugu" (aunts from father's side of the family) for the next generation.

"Guanxi," on the other hand, indicates the social network one is involved in or relationship with one another. In Mao's era, for example, people's relationship is "comrade guanxi" indicating a revolutionary bond between the two persons or belonging to the same economic class. When one is accused of being a traitor or counterrevolutionary, one immediately loses one's "comrade guanxi," and renders an "enemy guanxi." The economic reform has washed away "guanxi" related to revolutionary attachment and has been replaced with "money guanxi" with one another. The word tongzhi (comrade) has changed its meaning from revolutionary alliance to gay relationships.

While kinship indicates the hierarchical system of a network, "guanxi" implies a horizontal nature of a network in a relationship. "Guanxi," defined by Chang and Holt (1991) "implies a special connection between people, a connection which brings along with interactants' special rights and obligations" (p. 256). "Guanxi" is also "an informal, unofficial relationship utilized to get things done, from simple tasks to major life choices" (Gold, 1985, p. 661). Thus, "guanxi" is more important than kinship because it has an instrumental value and a utilitarian function. "Guanxi", unlike kinship, is not pre-existent. One has to "gao guanxi," (make guanxi), "la guanxi," (pull guanxi), and "zhao guanxi" (search for guanxi). A "guanxi" can be a former classmate, a former college, a relative, a friend's friend, a person from the same hometown. Once one "establishes a guanxi" one should be able to "manipulate guanxi" to one's own advantage. Because "guanxi" is so significant for one's success and it is permeated in every aspect of life, it is considered a field of inquiry called "the study of guanxi." A person good at "guanxi" is considered a competent communicator, a value orientation that differs but may be derived from the notion of kinship (Chen, 2001).

Conclusion and Implications

In this paper, we discussed the role of language in reflecting, communicating, and creating culture. We substantiated our claim that language change reflects and promotes cultural change by a comparative examination of language and value orientations in the traditional Chinese culture and contemporary Chinese culture. We focused our analysis in the areas of value orientation and social relationships with others. Our selected examples of language change and their impact on culture change illustrated the dynamic relationship and interplay of language and culture. Our mode of inquiry has broadened the current approaches to intercultural and international communication studies. Three implications can be generated from this study.

First, our analysis has shown that language, the lexical area in particular, is the bridge and mirror for people to learn or understand cultural value orientations. While the sound and structure of language is relatively stable, the vocabulary of language is ever changing which reflects cultural dynamics and diversified cultural experiences. By collecting, examining, and analyzing vocabulary changes in a language, our knowledge of a culture will be increased and kept up-to-date. Intercultural communication scholars should be alert to the ever changing vocabulary in a target culture. Just as a thermometer is used to tell the temperature of the weather, knowledge on the use of vocabulary can help reveal the cultural state, change, and vitality.

Second, our analysis has reinforced the shared notion that culture changes. The current labeling of cultures by their orientation types such as high-context and low-context cultures, and individual and collectivistic cultures are helpful in understanding communication and culture (Chung & Chen, 2007; Hall, 1977; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1972), but these labels also tend to lead to the impression that culture is static and stable (Chen, 2009; Lu, 1998). Culture changes along with its value orientations and the change in language can be correlated to internal and external factors as well as linguistic variations. Exploring these factors in facilitating culture and language change enhances a more in-depth understanding of a culture and treats culture as a dynamic and dialectical process.

Finally, understanding a culture from the linguistic perspective can help to establish shared meanings and to minimize intercultural communication misunderstandings. Although shared meanings are not necessarily based on linguistic competence of the other culture, the knowledge of a foreign language is helpful. Symbolic meanings can also be established by an inquiry of a culture through selected linguistic features. The interplay between language and culture creates infinite discursive possibilities that will enrich human experience and expand our vision of the universe. As China is still undergoing changes in all aspects of life, language and culture change are inevitable and will continue to be a fascinating area of study.

References

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Xing Lu, DePaul University

Guo-Ming Chen, University of Rhode Island

Correspondence to:

Dr. Xing Lu

College of Communication

DePaul University

1 East Jackson Blvd.

Chicago, IL 60604-2201

Email: LLU@depaul.edu

Guo-Ming Chen, Professor

Department of Communication Studies

University of Rhode Island

Kingston, RI 02881, USA

Email: gmchen@uri.edu

Indo China Relations since ages

Taken from: http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/PDFs/India-China_Relations.pdf
I Ching (Classic of Changes)
Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667.
India-China Relations
Zhōng-​Yìn​wàijiāo​guānxì 中​ 印 外 交 关 系
Existing in close proximity for thousands of years, the ancient civilizations of China and India had surprisingly little political interac- tion for most of that time. The twentieth cen- tury saw tensions between the two increase over disputed borders and geopolitical com- petition for power, influence, resources, and markets. How the relationship will develop and play out is an important question in the twenty-first century.
As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted markable resemblance to the Indian concept of mandala,in peace it to survive and prosper through the ages and against the odds. During the past three thousand years, every one of the Asian countries—some situated on the continental landmass, others being islands off the Asia mainland— has at some stage been directly influenced by one or both of these two great civilizations.
or circles, as outlined in Arthashastra, which postulated that a king’s neighbor is his natural enemy, while the king beyond his neighbor is his natural ally. The Chinese dy- nasties followed a similar policy of encircling and attack- ing nearby neighbors and maintaining friendly relations with more distant kingdoms (yuan jiao jin gong). Much like imperial China, tribute, homage, subservience—but not annexation—were the rightful fruits of victory in an- cient India.
Political contacts between ancient China and India were few and far between. In the cultural sphere, it was mostly a one-way street—from India to China. Hindu and Buddhist religious and cultural influence spread to China through Central Asia, and Chinese scholars were sent to Indian universities at Nalanda and Taxilla. Though Chinese and Indian civilizations reacted to one another during the first few centuries of the Christian era,
As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted markable resemblance to the Indian concept of mandala,
in peace and harmony for millennia. But as post-
colonial modern nation-states, with the excep- tion of a very short period of bonhomie in the early 1950s, relations between the two Asian giants have been marked by conflict, containment, mutual suspicion, distrust, and ri- valry. Just as the Indian subcontinental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s bilateral relationship with China also remains volatile and ridden with friction and tension.
Past Perfect: Ancient
Civilizations
China and India are two of the world’s oldest civiliza- tions, each with the quality of resilience that has enabled
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Both have long, rich strategic traditions: Both Kauti- lya’s Arthashastra—a treatise on war, diplomacy, state- craft, and empire—and Sunzi’s (Sun Tzu’s) Sunzi bingfa (The Art of War) were written over two thousand years ago in India and China, respectively. The traditional Chi- nese concept of international relations was based on con- centric circles from the imperial capital outward through variously dependent states to the barbarians. It bears re-
1143
1144 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Lake Baikal
Berkshire Encyclopedia of China
North Aral Sea
Balkhash
KoreaPyongyang Beijing Seoul
Uzbekistan
Tashkent
Tajikistan
Bishkek
South Yellow Korea
Astana
Russia
Aral SeaKazakhstan Lake
Ulan Bator
Mongolia
China
North
Sea of Japan (East Sea)
Kyrgyzstan
Sea
Dushanbe
Japan
East China Sea
Taiwan
Afghanistan
Kabul
Pakistan
New Delhi
Islamabad
Kathmandu
Bhutan
India
Hanoi
Bay Burma Laos of Bengal Vientiane
Yangon Thailand Bangkok Cambodia
Phnom Penh
Vietnam
Manila
South China Sea
Gulf of Thailand
cultural prowess also was an object of envy. Then in a complete reversal of fortune, the mighty Asian civiliza- tions declined, decayed, and disintegrated and were even- tually conquered by European powers.
Present Imperfect: From
Civilizations to Nation-States
The gradual westward expansion over the centuries under Mongol and Qing dynasties extended China’s influence over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang prov- ince). In contrast, India’s boundaries shrank following the
Sri Lanka Andaman Sea
Indian Ocean
Bandar Seri
Colombo
Begawan Kuala Lumpur Malaysia
the process of religious-cultural interaction ceased after about the tenth century ce (coinciding with the Islamic invasions of India). Since then, the two countries lived as if they were oblivious to each other’s existence for over a thousand years, until about the advent of the nineteenth century, when both came under the influence of Euro- pean powers.
Before the age of European colonization, China ac- counted for about 33 percent of the world’s manufactured goods and India for about 25 percent. China under the Song (960–1279) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties was the world’s superpower. Under the Guptas (c. 320–c.550 ce) and Mughals (1526–1857), India’s economic, military, and
Thimphu
Nepal Bangladesh Dhaka
Philippine Sea
Philippines
INDIA - CHINA
R E L AT I O N S
Brunei
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India-China Relations n Zhōng-Yìn​wàijiāo​guānxì n 中 印 外 交 关 系 1145
1947 partition that broke up the subcontinent’s strategic unity that went back two thousand years to the first Mau- rya empire (c. 324–c. 200 bce). Then came the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950; as a result the two nations came into close physical contact for the first time and clashed. India’s partition in 1947 and the Chinese occu- pation of Tibet in 1950 have allowed China to extend its reach and influence into a region where it had, in terms of history and civilization, previously exercised no influ- ence at all.
China-India relations have been tense ever since a bor- der dispute led to a full-scale war in 1962 and armed skir- mishes in 1967 and 1987. Several rounds of talks held over more than a quarter of a century (since 1981) have failed to resolve the disputed claims. Agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed border were signed in 1993 and 1996. An agreement on the guiding principles for settlement was concluded in 2005. However, China’s increasing assertiveness, as evidenced in increased incur- sions in Arunachal Pradesh by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 2005, has led to a rapid meltdown in the Sino-Indian border talks, despite public protestations of amity. Apparently, the Chinese believe that a border settlement, without major Indian territorial concessions, could potentially augment India’s relative power position, and thus impact negatively on China’s rise. While Chinese insist on the return of Tawang (the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama) on religious grounds, Indians seek the return of the sacred Mount Kailash-Mansarovar in Tibet, since it is a sacred religious place associated with the Hindu religion. The consequence is that the 2,520-mile frontier between India and China, one of the longest interstate borders in the world, remains the only one of China’s land borders not defined, let alone demarcated, on maps or delineated on the ground. The prospects of a negotiated settlement in the near future seem as remote as ever for several reasons. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its in- tentions and nervous about its capabilities, while expos- ing India’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses and ensuring New Delhi’s “good behavior” on issues of vital concern to China. Furthermore, unless and until Beijing succeeds in totally pacifying and sinicizing Tibet (as Inner Mongolia has been), China does not want to give up the “bargain- ing chip” that an unsettled boundary vis-à-vis India pro- vides it with. An unsettled boundary also suits Chinese
interests for the present because China’s claims in the western sector are complicated by the India-Pakistan dis- pute over Kashmir, Pakistan’s interests in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and Beijing’s interest in keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.
Even if the territorial dispute was resolved, China and India would still retain a competitive relationship. Other factors, apart from the territorial dispute, contribute to the fractious and uneasy relationship. These include the nature of China’s ties with India’s smaller South Asian neighbors (including its arming of them); the legacy of Cold War alignments (Beijing-Islamabad-Washington versus the Moscow–New Delhi axis); continuing unrest in Tibet and Kashmir; Chinese encroachments into what India sees as its sphere of influence; Beijing’s plans for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean; resource competi- tion; power asymmetry and a rivalry for the leadership of the developing world and multilateral forums; and, more recently, the nuclear and naval rivalries.
Since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), independent India has entertained hopes of a joint Sino-Indian leadership of Asia as a counter to Western influence, but the Chinese have shown no enthusiasm for sharing leadership of Asia with anyone, least of all India. After all, the main objective of China’s Asia policy is to prevent the rise of a peer competitor to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific’s sole “Middle Kingdom.” As an old Chinese saying goes, “one mountain cannot accommo- date two tigers.” Checkmated in East Asia by three great powers—Russia, Japan, and the United States—Beijing has long seen South and Southeast Asia as its spheres of influence and India as the main obstacle to achieving its strategic objective of regional supremacy in mainland Asia. Chinese policymakers’ preference for a balance- of-power approach in interstate relations has led them to provide military and political support to those countries that can serve as counterweights to Beijing’s perceived enemies and rivals. Recognizing that strategic-rival India has the size, might, numbers, and, above all, the intention to match China, Beijing has long followed hexiao, gongda policy in South Asia: “uniting with the small (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) to counter the big (India).”
For its part, India has always perceived the Sino- Pakistani nexus, in particular, as hostile and threaten- ing in nature. As the pivotal power in South Asia, India
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1146 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China
perceives itself much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to East Asia. That the “strategic space” in which India traditionally operated has become increas- ingly constricted due to Chinese penetration became fur- ther evident from Beijing’s forays into Myanmar (Burma) and the Bay of Bengal in the 1990s.
Historically and culturally India never played second fiddle to China. Therein lies the root cause of volatile and strained relationship: Seeing China as the reference point of India’s economic, security, and diplomatic policies, In- dia’s strategic analysts have long emphasized the need to keep up with China militarily. Initially, India’s nuclear capability was aimed solely at deterring China, not Paki- stan. It is the adversarial nature of the Sino-Indian rela- tionship that has driven India’s and, in turn, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs. The 1998 Indian nuclear tests were preceded by the Indian defense minister George Fernandes’ statements that called China a “bigger poten- tial threat” than Pakistan and described how his country was being “encircled” by Chinese military activities in Tibet and alliances with Pakistan and Myanmar. From New Delhi’s perspective, much of Beijing’s penetration deep into the South Asian region in the second half of the twentieth century has been primarily at India’s expense. At the heart of Sino-Indian antagonism is the Indian be- lief that China is seeking to deny India its proper stakes in the game of international politics. That China does not want India to emerge as an equal is evident from its op- position to India’s membership in the P-5 (UN Security Council), N-5 (Nuclear Club), ASEM (Asia-Europe Sum- mit), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and EAS (East Asia Summit).
Both China (after a century) and India (after a millen- nium) of decline are keen to assume the great power roles they believe have been their right in view of their histories and civilizations. Both have similar robust attributes of a strong power: massive manpower resources; a scientific, technological, and industrial base; and formidable armed forces. Both are nuclear and space powers with growing ambitions. When Chinese and Indian elites speak of re- storing their country’s rightful place in the world, they give expression to a concept of preeminence in Asia and the wider world. This concept reflects their perception that as the foundation of regional cultural patterns, their rightful place is at the apex of world hierarchy.
The similarities between the two Asian giants’ out- looks, aspirations, policies, and interests are indeed strik- ing, despite their differing political systems. Both want a new international status that is commensurate with their size, strength, and potential. Both identify the present pattern of international relations with a world order de- signed to perpetuate the world domination of Western powers. Both see Asia’s rise on the world stage as bringing about the end of Western dominance. Though uncom- fortable with the U.S. dominance in world affairs, both are courting Washington to help balance their relation- ships with each other until they are strong enough to do so on their own. Both oppose the status quo: China in terms of territory, power, and influence; India in terms of status, power, and influence. Both yearn for a truly mul- tipolar world that will provide them the space for growth and freedom of action that befits great powers. Both have practiced “tilted nonalignment” (during the Cold War China tilted toward the U.S. (1971–89) and India toward the USSR (1971–1991) while preaching independent, non- aligned foreign policies. Both vie for influence in Central, South, and Southeast Asia and for leadership positions in global and regional organizations. Each puts forward proposals for multilateral cooperation that deliberately exclude the other.
Both see themselves as great Asian powers whose time has finally come. Both have attempted to establish a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their neighborhoods with- out much success. Both claim that their attitude toward their neighbors is essentially benevolent, while making it clear that those neighbors must not make policies or take actions, or allow other nations to take measures in their countries, that each deems to be against its own interest and security. If they do so, China and India are willing to apply pressure in one fashion or another to bring about desired changes. Both are unable to reassert their tradi- tional suzerainty (dominion) over their smaller neigh- bors, as any attempt to do so encounters resistance from regional and extra-regional powers. Both remain suspi- cious of each other’s long-term agenda and intentions. Each perceives the other as pursuing hegemony and en- tertaining imperial ambitions. Neither power is comfort- able with the rise of the other. Both are locked in a classic security dilemma: One country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to
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India-China Relations n Zhōng-Yìn​wàijiāo​guānxì n 中 印 外 交 关 系 1147
the other. Both suffer from a siege mentality borne out of an acute consciousness of the divisive tendencies that make their countries’ present political unity so fragile. After all, much of Chinese and Indian history is made up of long periods of internal disunity and turmoil, when centrifugal forces brought down even the most powerful empires. Each has its weak point—regional conflicts, pov- erty, and religious divisions for India; the contradiction between a capitalist economy and Communist politics for China. Both are plagued with domestic linguistic, ethno- religious, and politico-economic troubles that could be their undoing if not managed properly.
China and India also share remarkable similarities in economic outlooks and policies. Both are focusing on increasing comprehensive national strength on a solid
economic-technological base. Both are major competi- tors for foreign investment, capital, trade, resources, and markets. Burgeoning economic ties between the world’s two fastest-growing economies have become the most salient aspect of their bilateral relationship. Both have begun to behave like normal neighbors—allowing trade and investment and promoting people-to-people contact. Bilateral trade flows are rising rapidly (from a paltry $350 million in 1993 to $30 billion in 2007) and could cross $60 billion in 2009 and double again by 2015 (The Times of India, 2008). Several joint ventures in power genera- tion, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, IT, and telecommunication are in the pipeline. Each is seeking to reintegrate its neighborhood with its national economy.
The Devas celebrating the attainment of the Bud- dhaship. An illustration from “A record of Bud- dhistic Kingdoms: Being an account by the Chinese Monk Fa-Hien of his trav- els in India and Ceylon (a.d. 399–424) in search of the Buddhist Books of Discipline.”
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1148 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China
But in the economic sphere Chinese and Indian econ- omies are still more competitive than complementary. Both look to the West and Japan for advanced technol- ogy, machinery, capital, and investment. Many Indians see China as predatory in trade and look with worry at China’s robust growth rates, fearing getting left behind. The Chinese economy is about 2.5 times greater than India’s, and China receives three times more foreign in- vestment than India ($74.7 billion for China versus $23 billion for India in 2008) (Hiscock, 2008). China’s dra- matic economic progress evokes envy, admiration, and a desire for emulation among Indians, who lament that whether China practices Communism (under Mao) or capitalism (post-Mao), it always does it better than In- dia. Obviously, India has a lot of catching up to do in the economic sphere. Besides, the bulk of Indian exports to China consists of iron ore and other raw materials, while India imports mostly manufactured goods from China—a classic example of a dependency model. While China’s economic boom offers profit and opportunity, Beijing’s strategic ambitions and efforts to lock up a sig- nificant share of Central Asian, African, Latin American, Burmese, and Russian energy resources and minerals for China’s exclusive use generate suspicion, envy, and fear. India’s poor transportation infrastructure and frequent power shortages remain the Achilles’ heel of India’s fast- growing economy, hindering its ability to compete with China. In theory, the partnership of China’s awesome manufacturing power with India’s enviable information technology and services sector could make “Chindia” the factory and back office of the world. But the reality is that China wants to beat India in the services sector, too. As a March 2004 Beijing Review commentary put it, in the IT software sector, “[a] fierce face-off with an old competitor—India—has [just] begun.”
Despite ever-increasing trade volumes, there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India. On almost all counts, the two Asian heavyweights clash or compete, and they are vulnerable to any deterioration in relations. Their burden of history, long memories, deep- rooted prejudice, tensions over unresolved territorial dis- putes, and global competition for natural resources and markets add to mutual distrust and tensions. Further- more, Beijing worries that the logic and pull of geopolitics is pushing India, much like Japan, to a strategic alliance with the United States so as to contain China.
Future Tense
China and India’s strategic cultures require both to regain the power and status their leaders consider appropriate to their country’s size, population, geographical position, and historical heritage. There have been numerous oc- casions in history when China and India were simulta- neously weak; there have been occasional moments of simultaneous cultural blossoming. But for more than half a millennium, Asia has not seen the two giants economi- cally and militarily powerful at the same time. That time is now approaching fast, and it is likely to result in sig- nificant new geopolitical realignments. The emergence of China and India as economic giants undoubtedly will throw a huge new weight onto the world’s geopolitical balance. As India grows outwardly, the two giants are be- ginning to rub shoulders (or ruffle feathers) in different parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. New economic prosperity and military strength is reawakening nation- alist pride in India, which could bring about a clash with Chinese nationalism. The existence of two economically powerful nations will create new tensions as they both strive to stamp their authority on the region.
In the power competition game, while China has surged ahead by acquiring economic and military capa- bilities underpinned by a clear policy to achieve broader strategic objectives, India has a lot of catching up to do. The existing asymmetry in international status and power serves Beijing’s interests very well; any attempt by India to challenge or undermine China’s power and influence or to achieve strategic parity is strongly resisted through a combination of military, economic, and diplomatic means.
More importantly, resource scarcity in the twenty- first century has now added a maritime dimension to the traditional Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry. As In- dia and China’s energy dependence on the Middle East and Africa increases, both are actively seeking to forge closer defense and security ties with resource-supplier nations, and to develop appropriate naval capabilities to control the sea lanes through which the bulk of their com- merce flows. Nearly 90 percent of Chinese arms sales go to countries located in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is investing heavily in developing the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Sri Lanka, Bangla- desh, and Myanmar. For its part, India has countered by
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India-China Relations n Zhōng-Yìn​wàijiāo​guānxì n 中 印 外 交 关 系 1149
promoting defense cooperation with Oman and Israel in the west of India while upgrading military ties with the Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles, and the United States in the Indian Ocean, and with Myanmar, Singapore, In- donesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and the United States in the east. Mari- time competition is set to intensify as Indian and Chi- nese navies show off their flags in the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. Their maritime rivalry is likely to spill into the open in a couple of decades’ time when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the In- dian Ocean, ostensibly to safeguard their respective sea lanes of communication. Perhaps sooner rather than later, China’s military alliances and forward deployment of its naval assets in the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, and Myanmarese ports would prompt India to respond in kind by seeking access to ports in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay), Taiwan (Kao-hsiung), and Japan (Okinawa), which would allow for the forward deployment of Indian naval assets to protect India’s East Asian shipping and Pacific Ocean trade routes, as well as access to energy resources from the Russian Sakhalin province.
For the foreseeable future, India-China ties will re- main fragile and as vulnerable as ever to sudden dete- rioration as a result of misperceptions, accidents, and eruption of unresolved issues. Simmering tensions over territory, overlapping spheres of influence, resource scar- city, and rival alliance relationships ensure that relations between the two rising Asian giants will be characterized more by competition and rivalry than cooperation for a long time to come. In the short to medium term, neither New Delhi nor Beijing will do anything that destabi- lizes their bilateral relationship or arouses the suspicions of their smaller Asian neighbors. Their efforts will be aimed at consolidating their power and position while striving to resolve more pressing domestic problems. But instability in Tibet, coupled with China’s military links with Pakistan and Myanmar, will pose a continu- ing complication in Sino-Indian relations. At the same time, both will continue to monitor closely each other’s activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region and will attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. India, like China, would prefer to avoid entangling alliances so as to maximize its options and freedom of action.
Nonetheless, a pro-U.S./pro-Japan tilt in India’s national security policy—a reaction to the power-projection ca- pabilities of China—will be a defining characteristic of an increasingly globalized India. But both sides would seek to keep the competition as muted as possible for as long as possible.
In the long term, neither Indian nor Chinese de- fense planners can rule out the possibility of a renewed confrontation over Tibet, Kashmir, Myanmar, or in the Indian Ocean. A Sino-Indian rivalry in southern Asia and the northern Indian Ocean (especially the Malacca Straits) may well be a dominant feature of future Asian geopolitics of the twenty-first century, which could force their neighbors to choose sides. The nature of the rivalry will be determined by how domestic political and eco- nomic developments in these two countries affect their power, their outlooks, and their foreign and security policies.
While they are competitors for power and influence in Asia, China and India also share interests in maintain- ing regional stability (for example, combating the grow- ing Islamic fundamentalist sector), exploiting economic opportunities, maintaining access to energy sources and markets, and enhancing regional cooperation. Coop- eration could allow them to balance U.S. influence and increase their negotiating positions with the sole super- power. On economic, environmental, and cultural issues, they may have far more reason to cooperate than to col- lide. Intensifying tourism, trade, and commerce should eventually raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. It is possible that economically prosperous and militarily confident China and India will come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual contain- ment policies start yielding diminishing returns, but this is unlikely to happen for a few decades.
J. Mohan MALIK
Further Reading
Garver, J. W. (2001). Protracted contest: Sino-Indian ri- valry in the twentieth century. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Hiscock, G. (2008, November 13). Trade push pulls In- dia to look outward. CNN.com. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/ asiapcf/11/11/india.trade/index.html
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1150 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China
India-China Relations: The Way Forward
Excerpts from an article by Indian Ambassador to China, Nirupama Rao, that appeared in the January 2009 issue of the Beijing Review.
During the visit of the then Indian Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988, at which I was a delegate and witness to history in the making, our young leader’s celebrated “long hand- shake” with China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, generated great excitement and anticipation as the two countries emerged out of their brief estrangement and looked boldly to the 21st century . . . The visit remains a defin- ing point in India-China relations . . .
Today, there is an overarching consensus across India’s political spectrum that an efficiently trans- acted, stable, durable and well-balanced relationship with China is vital to India. It is heartening to see sim- ilar sentiments expressed by the top leaders in China, who have defined ties with India as a strategic policy of their country. Our leaders today are meeting with increasing frequency, as befits the two great nations. Our two governments have decided to characterize our engagement in the changed geopolitical and geo- economic scenario as a Strategic and Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This means that we should not only take a strategic and long-term view of our bilateral ties in their multiple dimensions, but should constantly bear in mind our converging world- view of global, international and regional issues and events and thus give full play to our role as the two largest developing nations.
Thus our relations hold great promise, and beckon to us to rise to the challenges before us in a rapidly evolving world situation. As long as we keep the long- term and strategic nature of our partnership in mind, we will be able to calmly approach seemingly difficult and intractable issues in the interest of the long-term objectives of peace and friendship, which, as Pre- mier Wen Jiabao has famously observed, have been the mainstream of India-China civilization ties for 99.99 percent of the time. While the scope for compe- tition and cooperation exists side by side, the choice, of whether to make competition or cooperation the dominant theme of India-China discourse, is ours. . . Source: Rao, N. (2009, January 22). India-China relations: The way forward. Beijing Review. Retrieved February 26, 2009,
from http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2009-01/18/ content_175047_2.htm
Hoffmann, S. A. (1990). India and the China crisis. Berke- ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
India-China trade to reach $55bn, to surpass 2010 target. (2008, November 28). The Times of India, p. 1.
Lan Jianxue (2008, June). 中印对外战略异同与其双边 关系 [Differences and similarities in foreign strate- gies of China and India and their bilateral relations]. 外交评论 [Foreign Affairs Review], 103, 37–43.
Liu, Silu. (2007, June 1). 中印邊界談判北京不能急 [Bei- jing should not lose patience in Chinese-Indian bor- der talks]. Wen Wei Po, pp. 3–6.
Malik, J. M. (2005, Spring). Security Council reform: China signals its veto. World Policy Journal, 22(1), 19–29.
Malik, J. M. (2009). India’s response to China’s rise. In K. J. Cooney and Y. Sato (Eds.), The rise of China and
international security: America and Asia respond (pp.
177–212). London and New York: Routledge. Malik, M. (2006, March 29). China responds to the U.S.- India nuclear deal. China Brief, 6 (7). Retrieved on Sep- tember 30, 2008, from http://www.jamestown.org/ publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_
id=3670&article_id=237096 Malik, M. (2007, October 9). India-China competition
revealed in ongoing border disputes. The Power and Interest News Report. Retrieved September 30, 2008, from http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_ report&report_id=695&language_id=1
Pillsbury, M. (2000). China debates the future security environment. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
Indigenous Peoples—Taiwan ▶
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